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CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION: 
HOW DAVIS V. WASHINGTON REINS IN 
CRAWFORD’S REACH 
JOSEPHINE ROSS* 
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM CRAWFORD TO DAVIS, WHAT THOSE 
OPINIONS TELL US 
There were only two years from the time that the Supreme Court 
announced a revolution in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford 
v. Washington1  to the time that the Supreme Court took up the issue again 
in Davis v. Washington.2  During those two years, hundreds of trial and 
appellate judges were obligated to implement Crawford, often reviewing 
the same cases where convictions had been affirmed under pre-Crawford 
case law.  This subset of decisions offers a unique opportunity to investigate 
how lower courts implement Supreme Court decisions that are controversial 
and ambiguous.3  The switch in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence had 
enormous potential for upheaval in criminal law, particularly in the area of 
domestic violence prosecutions.  At the time that Crawford was announced 
in 2004, trial courts were routinely permitting domestic violence prosecu-
tions to proceed when the alleged victim did not appear to testify and there 
were no witnesses to the event. Instead, statements the complainant made to 
the 911 operator or to the police at the scene were repeated at trial.  There 
was no right to cross-examine or confront the person who made the 
statements, only the police officer who repeated the missing witness’ state-
ments.  Although this practice of witnessless prosecutions in domestic 
violence cases was fairly new, it had become entrenched by Crawford’s 
time.4 
 
 *Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. The author wishes to thank 
Dean Kurt Schmoke for a summer grant, Susan Henderson-Utis and Valerie Collins for their 
excellent research assistance, and Lisa Crooms and Andrew Taslitz for their helpful feedback. 
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
3. The term “lower courts” is used in this article to indicate both state courts and federal 
circuit courts, although the article focuses primarily on state courts because they are where the 
majority of domestic violence cases proceed. 
4. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354-58 (1992) (affirming the expanded use of the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule in a witnessless child abuse case and thereby 
signaling that the Confrontation Clause permits prosecutors to proceed without live witnesses in 
domestic violence prosecutions by using the excited utterance exception); Josephine Ross, After 
Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and “Witness” Does Not Mean 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford, if fully implemented, 
would have returned trial courts to the days when domestic violence cases 
were dismissed when witnesses failed to appear at trial.5  Although Craw-
ford was a notoriously ambiguous opinion, leaving “for another day” the 
precise scope of its ruling, it heralded an end to the practice of witnesses 
testifying in absentia.6  Rather than reading the decision broadly and revers-
ing domestic violence convictions that were based on out-of-court state-
ments to police repeated at trial or on out-of-court phone calls played at 
trial, courts found ways to affirm the convictions by reading, or, as I posit, 
misreading the Supreme Court precedent.  The 2006 Supreme Court case of 
Davis v. Washington7 specifically addressed the types of evidence frequent-
ly introduced in domestic abuse prosecutions without the witness present to 
cross-examine, namely, 911 calls and statements to police at the scene.  In 
Davis, the Court had an opportunity to correct the lower courts’ narrow 
interpretation of Crawford. Instead, Davis seemed to forget the principles 
annunciated in Crawford, such as that “no man shall be prejudiced by 
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine,”8 and that our sys-
tem of justice is based on a “common-law tradition . . . of live testimony in 
court subject to adversarial testing.”9  Davis provided no constitutional 
protection for many defendants facing trial based on out-of-court 
accusations without the witness there to testify face-to-face or to cross-
examine.  By examining the cases decided between Crawford and Davis, 
we can recognize that Davis represents a capitulation to the lower court 
judges who offered various methods of limiting the scope of Crawford’s 
promised protections for those accused of crimes. 
Judicial decision-making is generally understood to work in a top-
down manner, with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchy.10  Social 
Science researchers Songer, Segal and Cameron envisioned the relationship 
 
Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 153-54 (2006) (noting that where the author 
practiced, it was not until 1999 that this became routine). 
5. Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 
IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003) (estimating that eighty to ninety percent of domestic violence 
victims recant or do not come to court). 
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  Crawford was not a domestic violence prosecution but a 
murder case in which the government introduced a statement to police by a witness to the crime 
that was then repeated at trial when the witnessed exercised her marital privilege.   
7. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).  
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)). 
9. Id. at 43 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
373-74 (1768)). 
10. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295 (2005)  “In 
the legal academy, thinking about the judicial system is distinctly top-down.  There is a hierarchy, 
and at the pinnacle sits the Supreme Court.” Id. 
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between the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts as an owner walking 
a dog on a leash.11  The Supreme Court is the owner and the lower courts 
(the dogs) are expected to stay with the owner.  When the Supreme Court 
changes course, it is like a pull on the leash, and the lower courts will 
follow.  Sometimes the lower court judges want to go the same way as the 
high court—what researchers call “congruence”—and sometimes judges 
simply alter their decisions to conform to the desires of the Supreme Court, 
what researchers call “responsiveness.”12  Researchers note that it is often 
difficult to determine whether decisions that conform to precedent are 
congruent with the attitudes of the lower court judges or whether the judges 
are simply responding to the precedent.13  Some decisions allow more leash 
than others, but there is almost always some room given within opinions for 
lower court deviation.  It is only when the dog goes beyond the discretion 
provided by the original precedent that the Supreme Court needs to rein in 
the dog, reversing the case. 
Political scientists use the term “shirking” to apply to lower court 
judges who do not wish to implement the policy but do anyway because of 
the principal-agent hierarchy.14  In a recent article, Pauline Kim embraced 
the leash analogy but criticized applying the term “shirking” to judges who 
ultimately conform their rulings to precedent.15  Kim argues that the term 
shirking “is implicitly pejorative”16 and that it is good judicial practice for 
lower courts to decide cases using their own policy preferences as long as 
these preferences are within the zone of discretion provided by the higher 
court.17  Post-Crawford domestic violence opinions enable us to flesh out 
Professor Kim’s theory against the backdrop of real case decisions.  I use 
the phrase “straining the leash” for what the lower courts did post-
Crawford, signaling their discomfort with forbidding witness statements in 
the absence of live witnesses to domestic violence situations. 
In a twist on the walking a dog paradigm, the Supreme Court opinion 
in Davis appears to have been influenced by the state courts shirking or 
straining at the leash.  What the Davis decision suggests is that it is not 
 
11. Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: 
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 673, 674-75 (1994). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 689 (whether the appellate court panels’ “responsiveness to the High Court . . . is 
enhanced by the Court’s monitoring or is solely a function of their own internalized norms that are 
reinforced by their peers in the circuit is difficult to determine empirically”). 
14. Id. at 674. 
15. Pauline Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 386 n.13, 386-87 (2007). 
16. Id. at 413 n.121.  
17. Id. at 394. 
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always a question of the Supreme Court declaring a constitutional right and 
the lower courts diligently struggling to interpret the opinion and implement 
it.  In the context of the right to confrontation, we see the lower courts 
resisting implementation of the newly expanded constitutional right and, in 
turn, the Supreme Court influenced by this resistance. 
II. CRAWFORD ANNOUNCED A REINVIGORATED RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION 
Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion in Crawford, announcing a 
new era for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Craw-
ford overruled a line of cases commencing in 1980 with Ohio v. Roberts,18 
which had tied to the fluid rules of evidence the right of the accused to 
confront witnesses.  The Confrontation Clause would no longer be welded 
to the hearsay rules, but would require its own independent review.19 
The text of the Sixth Amendment reads: “In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”20  The term “witnesses,” Scalia explained, applies to those 
who “bear testimony.”21  If a statement is “testimonial” in nature, Scalia 
wrote, the Constitution requires nothing less than cross-examination, 
assuming that the witness was available for trial.22  If the witness is 
unavailable, the Constitution allows prior testimony where there was an 
opportunity for cross-examination.23  It was intolerable that judges would 
decide that evidence was particularly reliable under the Roberts format and 
therefore dispense with the requirement of face-to-face confrontation and 
cross-examination.  Reliability may be useful for rules of evidence, but the 
 
18. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
19. The opinion was joined by six other justices while Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justice O’Connor, wrote a concurrence highly critical of the majority’s new jurisprudence.  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-76 (2004).  Both dissenters were no longer on the bench 
for the Davis v. Washington case in 2006. 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270 (2006).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurrence was highly critical of the majority’s break with prior jurisprudence.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-76.  In determining the future of Crawford in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence one must note that Crawford’s validity will not be threatened by the replacement of 
the Chief Justice in 2005 and Justice O’Connor in 2006, since they both participated in the 
minority opinion in Crawford’s 7-2 split.  If anything, Crawford’s continued validity is even more 
assured. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees in criminal cases the right to a speedy, public trial by jury, the right to be informed of 
the nature of the accusation, the right to confront witnesses, the right to counsel, and the right to 
compulsory process (for defendant to call witnesses). Id. 
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
22. Id. at 56. 
23. Id. at 59. 
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Constitution required that the jurors decide whether evidence is reliable and 
credible.24 
Crawford declined to define the term “testimonial,” and the lower 
courts misinterpreted the opinion’s ambiguity.25  Crawford intended a 
sweeping change in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis in 
order to return to what was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  Crawford’s 
majority opinion discussed what confrontation means “at a minimum” and 
nowhere said that confrontation rights must be kept to this minimum.  The 
Court wrote that “the infamous proceedings against Sir John Fenwick [in 
England]” in 1696 “must have burned into the general consciousness the 
vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination.”26  The 
Court further wrote that: “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony 
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with [a] jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth Amendment pre-
scribes.”27  The Court thus envisioned an end to trial judges permitting out-
of-court statements without confrontation rights simply because the evi-
dence rules permit the statements.  Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that 
statements introduced against Mr. Crawford violated his right to confront 
witnesses could easily have been reached under older established law, were 
the Court not interested in breathing new life into a right that had been 
languishing.28  The thrust of the decision was a broadening of rights 
coupled with an invitation for later Supreme Court opinions to flesh out the 
full reach of Crawford. 29 
 
24. See Ross, supra note 4, at 53 for a further discussion of Crawford’s distrust of judges and 
for a comparison of the concepts of reliability and credibility.  If the term “testimonial” is defined 
narrowly, then judges will again be in the business of deciding that evidence is so reliable that 
cross-examination will not aid the jury in making a decision.  Richard Friedman, Confrontation: 
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1028 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, 
Confrontation].  “If a witness delivers live testimony at trial, the court does not excuse the witness 
from cross-examination on the ground that the evidence is so reliable that cross-examination is 
unnecessary to assist the determination of truth.” Id. 
25. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
26. Id. at 45-46 (citing Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-592 (H.C. 1696); 3 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 22). 
27. Id. at 62. 
28. See id. at 69 (stating that the Chief Justice concurred in the result and dissented in the 
Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).  Justice Thomas sought to 
create a ceiling to confrontation rights in his concurrence in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) but that idea is not expressed in Crawford.  
29. Although most jurisdictions have narrowed the reach of Crawford, there are at least two 
jurisdictions that interpret Crawford broadly: 
Georgia: See Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. 2004) (noting that a statement 
at the scene was testimonial but harmless error); see also Pitts v. State, 627 S.E.2d 17, 
2 (Ga. 2006) (holding that it was harmless error to admit testimonial statement when a 
police officer testified about what witness told him shortly after the defendant shot 
into the bedroom in which she was sleeping).  “Georgia courts have adopted a broad 
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A. THE TERM “CORE” IMPLIES THERE IS A ZONE OF PROTECTION 
LARGER THAN THE CORE 
Consider the word “core” within the Crawford opinion.  The decision 
lists several possible definitions of “core” testimonial rights, but nowhere 
says that the right to confrontation must only apply to these core testimonial 
rights.30  While the opinion was likely a compromise, and the justices may 
have had different concepts of the scope of the revitalized Confrontation 
Clause, the common usage of the term “core” supports the interpretation 
that there is more to protect than just the core. In the dictionary, “core” is 
defined as the “fibrous central part of certain fruits . . . containing the 
seeds;” also as “the basic or most important part; the essence.”31  It is never 
the whole, but always a central part.  To determine if something falls out-
side of the purview of confrontation rights, one would need to understand 
the core definition and core values the Clause protects, but the core would 
hardly describe the full landscape of evidence protected. 
Many scholars interpreted Crawford’s focus on the definition of “core” 
testimonial statements to mean that the resuscitated Confrontation Clause 
only applied to core testimonial statements.32  However, the opinion uses 
terms such as “at a minimum,” signifying that the Sixth Amendment covers 
much more than the minimum.  Consider this sentence from the text: “it 
applies at a minimum to . . . the modern practices with closest kinship to the 
abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,” such as police 
interrogations.33  Or consider this quotation: “Statements taken by police 
 
interpretation of interrogation and have generally found statements made to police are 
testimonial.” State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 772 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing several 
Georgia decisions). 
Hawaii: In State v. Grace, the court found that statements made to police at the scene 
by ten and eleven year olds explaining how their mother was hit were testimonial 
because they “were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 111 
P.3d 28, 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005).  However, the court may have been influenced by 
the fact that the police officer did not establish a solid foundation for an excited 
utterance, testifying that they were not upset; rather, “they seen what happened so they 
were anxious to tell what they saw.” Id. at 31. 
30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-56. 
31. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 407 (4th ed. 
2000).  
32. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due 
Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 39 (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/cjmag/20-2/taslitz.html (“The scope of that core[—]and thus the 
meaning of ‘testimonial’—was not decisively demarcated by Crawford.”); see also Robert P. 
Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (2005) (stating that “Justice Scalia’s opinion points towards a 
narrow construction” although Mosteller thinks there is room for a somewhat broader view). 
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
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officers in the course of interrogations are also ‘testimonial’ under even a 
narrow standard.”34  This language suggests not only that there were multi-
ple types of core statements but that the Supreme Court intended to cover 
more than the mere core discussed. 
B. IN FREE SPEECH THE CORE IS NOT THE CIRCUMFERENCE 
The use of the term “core” in First Amendment jurisprudence points 
the way to a proper reading of the term “core” in Crawford.  When the 
Crawford opinion discussed “possible core definitions” of testimonial state-
ments, the Court meant those statements that most implicate the values that 
the Sixth Amendment was designed to protect.35  Similarly, the word “core” 
is used in free speech jurisprudence to identify those forms of speech that 
most implicate the values that the First Amendment was designed to 
protect.36  For example, political speech is said to be “core” speech.37  In 
deciding whether the term “core” in Crawford signals a broad or narrow 
conception of the Confrontation Clause, we should look to the First 
Amendment doctrine, where the concept of core values has been established 
through Supreme Court case law. 
Free speech doctrine is instructive for a number of reasons.  First, in 
the free speech arena, the Supreme Court does not limit protection only to 
those forms of speech that the Court defines as core.38  Case law created a 
hierarchy where core speech receives more protection than non-core speech, 
but only a few categories of speech fall completely outside the First 
 
34. Id. at 52. 
35. Id. at 51-52; see also Brief for Petitioner at 23, 33-34, Crawford v. Washington, No. 02-
9410 (U.S. July 24, 2003) (using the term core as in “core concerns of the Confrontation Clause” 
but explicitly excluding from the clause only “hearsay statements made unrelated to any pending 
or potential prosecution.”).  
36. See generally Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (“[P]olitical belief and 
association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.”). 
37. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“[C]ontributions to political 
campaigns generate essential political speech.  And contribution caps, which place a direct and 
substantial limit on core speech, should be met with the utmost skepticism and should receive the 
strictest scrutiny.”). 
38. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (citing Bolger 
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)) (“As a general matter, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content . . . [h]owever, this principle, like other First Amendment 
principles, is not absolute.”); see also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 757 
(1985) (“[W]hen the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern . . . we must . . . 
balance the State’s interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation 
against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression.”). 
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Amendment’s reach.39  First Amendment doctrine therefore supports a 
broad reading of the Confrontation Clause, in which the clause protects 
more than just “core” testimonial statements.  Second, in the free speech 
arena, the Court has never settled on one definition of “core” speech or 
“core” purpose for the First Amendment, but has allowed a variety of core 
purposes to remain within the doctrine.  In Crawford, the Court did not 
choose one core definition of testimonial but proffered several.  The First 
Amendment doctrine suggests that the Court need not decide on any one 
core definition of testimonial statements.  A jurisprudence that allows sev-
eral definitions of core testimonial statements to co-exist will provide more 
protection to defendants than if the Supreme Court insists on one definition.  
A third way that First Amendment jurisprudence can inform Confrontation 
Clause analysis is by examining the role that the fear of governmental abuse 
plays in interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.40  
Although Crawford correctly recognized that the Confrontation Clause was 
designed as a check on governmental power, Davis used this insight to 
incorrectly limit the clause to statements taken by police for certain 
purposes.41 
Turning to the first issue, the Supreme Court does not limit free speech 
protections only to core speech.  Although the Court has articulated what it 
considers to be core expression, much expression that would never be 
labeled political or core by any stretch of the imagination enjoys First 
Amendment protection.  There is a hierarchy of speech that allows different 
degrees of protection depending upon whether speech is labeled as core 
speech or categorically unprotected speech, or something in-between.  
Categorically unprotected speech is limited to obscenity, fighting words, 
libel or slander, threats or advocacy of illegal action, but even this type of 
 
39. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)) (“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues 
‘has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”); Wilson R 
Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: 
The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 827 (2004) (emphasis omitted) (arguing 
that the Court is moving away from speech categories towards a test that looks “upon the degree 
to which the law suppressed expression of particular ideas or denied people the opportunity to 
express themselves”). 
40. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse 
solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependant upon a showing that 
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. 
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence 
dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections. 
Id. 
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
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speech does not fall wholly outside First Amendment protection.42  By 
naming the types of speech that fall outside the purview of First Amend-
ment protection, the Supreme Court allows other types of non-core speech 
to enjoy protection even though the rights are subject to certain types of 
governmental regulation.43 
One ready example of non-core speech is commercial speech, for 
although it is less protected than other kinds of speech, advertisements and 
other forms of commercial speech have had constitutional protection for 
thirty years.44  The debate about what theory underlies free speech rights 
takes place in the margins, not at the core.  In determining whether certain 
speech is beyond the First Amendment canopy, courts enunciate versions of 
core principles to determine if the speech at issue furthers the principles laid 
forth.45  In commercial cases, the value of the public receiving information 
about products has been given various amounts of importance.46  Generally, 
 
42. Even for categories of unprotected speech, the First Amendment does not condone 
viewpoint discrimination. See Virginia v. Black, 583 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (stating that statute 
may ban cross burning for purposes of intimidation for “[u]nlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., the 
Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward one of the 
specified disfavored topics.”).  For cases allowing regulation of unprotected speech see, e.g., Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 
(1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (fighting words);  
see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (allowing government to forbid advocacy 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” that “is likely to incite or produce 
such action”). 
43. Some types of speech that are recognized to fall outside of core speech but still enjoy 
protection are sexual speech, campaign financing, and commercial speech. See, e.g., Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (invalidating a law banning sexual materials that do not 
meet the Court’s definition of obscene); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 
(2003) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28, 47 (1976) (per curiam)) (stating that campaign 
contributions carry “a plain threat to political integrity”); Suzanne Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good 
Judges, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 3, 4 (2004) (determining that while commercial speech receives 
constitutional protection, it is subject to more regulation than non-commercial speech). 
44. See Sherry, supra note 43, at 4 (noting that since Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) the Court continues to affirm that 
“commercial speech is constitutionally protected but subject to greater regulation than non-
commercial speech”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
564 (1980) (“The Statute must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on 
commercial speech.”).  However, “commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a 
hardy breed of expression that is not ‘particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad 
regulation.’” Id. at 564 n.6.  
45. In determining whether a particular form of speech falls outside First Amendment 
protection, the Court looks at the meaning and core purpose of the Free Speech Clause, but does 
not limit protection only to those forms of speech that formed the core purpose of the First 
Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“All ideas having even the slightest 
redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the 
prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable 
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.”). 
46. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (according less protection to commercial speech and 
not branding the right to make informed decisions as core); but see id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging the advertising ban that promotes the use of electricity as “strikes at 
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information about a product or service is not viewed as core and the Court 
has fashioned rules for commercial speech regulation that are different than 
those for pure political or artistic expression.47 
Borrowing from the First Amendment context, the Court may continue 
to have various formulations of core protected statements while bestowing a 
different test for protecting non-core statements.  Only certain statements 
need fall outside of any constitutional scrutiny, just as only a few categories 
of speech—such as obscenity—fall completely outside of First Amendment 
protection.48  An analogy to free speech jurisprudence suggests that the 
term “core” describes the most important purposes served by a section in 
the Bill of Rights without restricting the Amendment to its core purposes. 
Turning to the second issue above, there is no single definition of core 
value in free speech cases.  When determining the standard for libel, free 
speech has been described as valuable because it provides “uninhibited 
robust and wide-open debate on public issues.”49  In an obscenity case, free 
speech was described as important because it provides audiences with 
“serious literary, artistic or scientific value.” 50  In deciding whether fighting 
words should fall inside or outside the scope of protection, the Court has 
considered the importance of the “exposition of ideas.”51  Recognizing that 
the value of the free speech clause is both personal and societal, the Court 
wrote that the “freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of 
individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the 
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”52  Thus, 
there are multiple values that the First Amendment was designed to protect, 
 
the heart of the First Amendment” and calling the advertising regulation a “covert attempt by the 
State to manipulate the choice of its citizens [and] . . . depriv[e] the public of the information 
needed to make a free choice”). 
47. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978) (“To require a parity of 
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, 
simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter 
kind of speech.”).  
48. One could argue that the First Amendment is different because of the fear of chilling 
expression and because it is such an expansive right.  On the other hand, the Confrontation Clause 
is already bounded by certain facts that make it much less unwieldy even if the right were deemed 
absolute; namely, it only applies to a trial of a criminal case where the government is attempting 
to introduce the evidence.  It is further bounded by the fact that it only arises in situations where 
evidence law would otherwise render evidence admissible, and the rule is limited by other factors 
such as the forfeit rule. 
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
50. There has been friction in the obscenity arena about how much speech outside the core is 
included within the First Amendment, but it is has never been limited to core values such as 
political discourse. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[B]efore today, the protections of the First Amendment have never been thought to 
be limited to expressions of serious literary or political value.”). 
51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
52. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988). 
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including political ideas, literary merit, scientific ideas, the right to speak 
one’s mind as well as the value of public debate. 
Similarly, in the Sixth Amendment context, there is no necessity for the 
Court to provide only one core purpose or core definition of the Confron-
tation Clause.  Given the free speech doctrine in this area, readers of 
Crawford should not assume that there is only one core definition of 
testimonial.  Instead, readers should assume that as new confrontation 
issues greet the Court, the Court is likely to expand its understanding of the 
core purposes of the clause as it has in the context of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.  The term “core,” therefore, signifies an 
expansive view of the reinvigorated right to confront witnesses.  The 
Confrontation Clause has the capacity to have multiple core values as does 
the First Amendment. 
Turning to the third issue above, free speech doctrine is also useful in 
helping to determine what should constitute “core” testimonial statements.  
To determine core protections for any constitutional right, one begins by 
identifying the purpose of the Amendment.53  The First Amendment, like 
the Sixth Amendment, is informed by the Framers’ healthy distrust of 
governmental overreaching.  In the free speech context, the Amendment 
broadly guards against control of what people think and say.54  The fear of 
government translates into all cases where the government is prosecuting 
individuals for free expression, even where the government had no hand in 
producing the expression, only in suppressing it.55  Moreover, fear of 
governmental abuse is so broadly enforced that it even extends to private 
actions for libel.  The government is the actor in these cases only in the 
sense that the state allows libel actions to proceed.56  Even speech that is 
 
53. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). 
54. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 (“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of 
the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest 
and concern.”). 
55. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (involving an epithet on a jacket).  
Although speech occurring in a public forum generally receives more protection than private 
speech, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, Justice Rehnquist wrote that “fostering private speech” constitutes 
an interest of the “highest order.” 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  In 
Bartnicki, the Court upheld the right of radio station to broadcast intercepted cell phone 
conversation despite wiretap laws that protected privacy by forbidding the broadcast of illegally 
intercepted conversations.  Id. at 544. 
56. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (“[H]ere, we are 
attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional 
command of the First Amendment.  It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for 
defamatory falsehood reach no further than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest 
involved.”). 
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uttered from one private individual to another is still clearly protected from 
prosecution under the First Amendment.57 
The way that distrust of government informs constitutional doctrine for 
First Amendment analysis should help the Court embrace a broad under-
standing of the term testimonial for Confrontation Clause analysis.  In a 
prior article, I argued that the Confrontation Clause should not turn on 
whether a police officer gathered the information, since the prosecutor is a 
government actor and it is the prosecutor who seeks to present the evidence 
at trial as testimony against the accused.58  The phrase “witness against” the 
accused in the Confrontation Clause should refer to whether the statements 
serve the same purpose as live testimony at trial, not the intent of the person 
making the statement or taking the statement when it was first uttered.59  
First Amendment analysis supports this broad understanding of what consti-
tutes core testimony, for free speech rights are hardly limited to patrolling 
governmental production of statements. 
As in First Amendment case law, there is no reason for the Court to 
limit Sixth Amendment protections depending upon how the police 
obtained statements.  If free speech recognizes government action to occur 
where there is prosecution or fear of prosecution, then the Confrontation 
Clause should also recognize the danger of governmental abuse in the fact 
of prosecution itself.  That the government used or plans to use these 
statements in a courtroom to prosecute an individual should be enough to 
qualify these statements for Sixth Amendment protection even if the police 
initially gathered the statements for purposes other than law enforcement.  
After all, the courts want police to continue investigating crimes and to 
continue taking statements from witnesses, just as the Framers wanted 
witnesses to testify before grand juries.  It is the repetition of the statements 
and not the manner in which the statements were taken that creates a 
violation of the Bill of Rights.  There is the potential of governmental abuse 
in the act of prosecution and in the Sixth Amendment context; the specific 
danger is that of prosecutors obtaining convictions based on out-of-court 
statements without live witnesses.  By analogizing to the free speech arena, 
one can grasp how broadly the Crawford opinion should be understood.  By 
using the term “core,” the opinion described the most important purposes 
served by this clause in the Bill of Rights without restricting the 
Confrontation Clause to these core purposes.  The opinion set out a range of 
possible definitions of core, allowing for an expansion of protections as 
 
57. See generally Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
58. Ross, supra note 4, at 196-98. 
59. Id. at 215. 
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different core values become clear.  And finally, the Court’s focus on gov-
ernmental abuse as an underpinning of the Confrontation Clause supports a 
broad reading of the clause just as the First Amendment is implicated 
whenever the government prosecutes an individual for statements made, 
regardless of whether the government helped create the statement.60 
The First Amendment is not the only area of law where the term core 
refers to only some of what the Constitution protects.  Initially, the Miranda 
warnings were treated by the Supreme Court as a prophylactic rule designed 
to advance core constitutional protections.61  In Dickerson v. United States, 
the Supreme Court finally declared the Miranda warnings to be a consti-
tutional rule, overturning a law that instructed courts to ignore Miranda 
when determining the validity of confessions.62  Even though Miranda was 
finally recognized as a constitutionally mandated rule, it is not viewed as a 
core constitutional right.63  Justice Thomas defined “the core protection 
afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause” to be “a prohibition on compel-
ling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial” and also 
described the clause as advancing the goal of “assuring trustworthy 
evidence,” presumably by preventing false confessions.64  Thomas recog-
nized that there was not a complete fit between the core concerns of the 
Confrontation Clause and the mandated Miranda warnings.  In United 
States v. Patane, Justice Thomas noted that Miranda requirements “sweep 
beyond the actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”65  The 
 
60. One sobering aspect of the First Amendment is that the protections tend to wane in times 
of perceived national crisis.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919).  In upholding the 
Espionage Act of 1917, the Court seemed to accept a narrowing of the scope of what constitutes 
protected political dissent and a broadening of what constitutes advocacy of illegal action and 
categorically unprotected speech.  See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“We 
admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the 
circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends 
upon the circumstances in which it is done.”).  One could analogize here to Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, where perhaps the Court is influenced by the perceived crisis in crime, including 
domestic violence. 
61. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 467-72 (1966) (establishing Miranda warnings and the right of individuals to protection 
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution). 
62. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441-44 (2000). (“Miranda, being a constitu-
tional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.”); see Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards And Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1274, 1305 (2006) (discussing the constitutionality of the Miranda rule). 
63. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-42 (2004). 
64. Id. at 637; see Note, Constitutional Law, 18 HARV. L. REV. 296, 298-300 (2004) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 (attributing the 
longstanding inadmissibility of coerced confessions in English and American law to the belief that 
such confessions are inherently unreliable); see also Note, Self-Incrimination, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
302, 312, n.56 (2002). 
65. Patane, 542 U.S. at 639. 
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Miranda rule “creates a presumption of coercion” in order to protect against 
“the possibility of coercion inherent in custodial interrogations.”66  This 
protective rule should only be extended to exclude evidence seized as a 
result of non-Mirandized statements if this extension would extend “the 
‘Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence’ or by any deter-
rence rationale.”67  Thus, Fifth Amendment protection of core principles, 
like the First Amendment protection, involves a protective layer surround-
ing the core. 
By discussing protections outside of the core, I do not mean to suggest 
that the formula set forth in Ohio v. Roberts68 for determining the appli-
cation of the Confrontation Clause continued to have force after Crawford.  
The Roberts formula was based on the notion that reliable evidence need 
not be tested through live testimony subject to cross-examination, and, 
consequently, allowed judges to determine what was reliable.69  If evidence 
was reliable, then the confrontation requirement could be lifted.  As 
Professor Taslitz has noted, if Roberts survived, it would be through a 
residual due process analysis separate from the Sixth Amendment.70  
Crawford analyzed confrontation differently from Roberts.  Unlike Roberts, 
Crawford distrusted judges as gatekeepers.71  The core value being 
protected in the Confrontation Clause was the process of determining 
reliability and credibility, namely that the factfinder would determine these 
after the witness testified by answering questions posed by counsel from 
both sides.  Thus, Crawford’s breadth is defined by its enunciated policy to 
return criminal courts to a system where “no man shall be prejudiced by 
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”72 
 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 640 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985)). 
68. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
69. Id. at 62-66. 
70. Taslitz, supra note 32, at 40, 43 (“Thoroughly unreliable evidence entirely casually 
unconnected with governmental action is thus not the Confrontation Clause’s concern. Roberts is 
indeed dead.”). 
71. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).  
72. Id. at 49 (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794) (per curiam)).  
Similarly, before the Confrontation Clause was adopted, the complaint at one state’s convention 
was that it was still not determined whether an accused “is to be allowed to confront the witnesses 
and have the advantage of cross examination.”  Id. at 48 (citing 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 110-11 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863)). 
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III. THE DAVIS DECISION REDUCED THE MINUMINUM CORE 
PROTECTION TO THE MAXIMUM 
When the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in a couple of domestic 
violence prosecutions, resulting in Davis v. Washington, the Court had the 
opportunity to reaffirm Crawford’s bold vision of the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to confront witnesses.73  This opportunity was particularly important 
because an overwhelming number of state courts and lower federal courts 
had continued affirming domestic violence convictions where the primary 
evidence against the defendants were accusations made out of court and 
repeated at trial through police officers or 911 recordings.74 
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court combined two domestic 
violence prosecutions into one opinion, sometimes referred to as 
Davis/Hammon since the other case reviewed was Hammon v. Indiana.75  
Both cases involved the excited utterance exception to the rule against 
hearsay.76  A statement constitutes an excited utterance (sometimes referred 
to as a spontaneous utterance or spontaneous declaration) if it is made while 
still under the stress of an exciting event, before the declarant has had time 
to fabricate.77  John Henry Wigmore is generally recognized as the midwife 
and advocate of the excited utterance exception, writing more than one 
hundred years after the Sixth Amendment’s ratification.78  During the time 
of the Framers, the res gestae exception distinguished between statements 
that were “an inseparable part of the event itself,” from those that were 
“purely narrative of what had already transpired.”79  Statements describing 
 
73. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-80 (2006).  The Davis Court reviewed two 
domestic violence convictions, Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) and Washington 
v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).  Id. at 2270-73.  The Davis Court reversed Hammon and 
affirmed Davis.  Id. at 2280. 
74. See infra discussion section IV (discussing the misinterpretation of Crawford’s ambigu-
ity in first responder cases). 
75. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 448-49, rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), remanded to 853 N.E.2d 
477 (Ind. 2006); Washington, 111 P.3d at 847, aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
76. In Hammon, the trial court also admitted the affidavit of the complainant as a present 
sense impression. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447.  “The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the 
affidavit was properly admitted, reasoning that the issue was academic because the affidavit was 
cumulative of Mooney’s testimony and therefore harmless, if error at all.” Id. at 448.   
77. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
78. Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception 
to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 159, 169 n.22 (1997); see also Margaret A. Berger, 
The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint 
Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, n.141 (1992) (establishing the timeframe for the birth of the 
excited utterance and noting that Wigmore published three editions of his Treatise, in 1904, 1923 
and 1939). 
79. Brief of Petitioner at 11-12, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2005) (No. 05-5224), 
2005 WL 3598182. 
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a shocking or traumatic event were not admitted before Wigmore, with 
perhaps a couple of cases that constituted exceptions to the general rule.  
Wigmore examined these exceptions and brought a psychological gaze to 
bear on the issue, concluding that the spontaneous utterance exception 
should be unmoored from res gestae, and that people should be able to 
testify about underlying events even if the retelling was not immediate.  The 
premise upon which excited utterance exception rests has long been in 
doubt, namely that people are physically incapable of lying when they are 
under great stress.80  An irony within the excited utterance exception is that 
in order for a trial judge to conclude that a witness was under the influence 
of a stressful event (generally the crime perpetrated against him), the trial 
judge must first conclude that there was such a stressful event.  In cases 
where the only evidence of the stressful event was the alleged victim’s out-
of-court statement, the judge must determine the witness’s credibility with-
out hearing the witness testify and without benefit of cross-examination.81 
In an effort to prosecute criminal cases where eye-witnesses and 
victims do not show up at trial, prosecutors began using the excited 
utterance exception during the 1990s as a means to conduct witnessless 
prosecutions.82  Under the Roberts framework, excited utterances were held 
not to violate the Confrontation Clause because they were “firmly rooted” 
exceptions to the hearsay rule and therefore inherently reliable.83  Hammon 
and Davis are typical examples of witnessless domestic violence 
prosecutions. 
A. THE DECISION IN THE APPEAL OF DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
The facts in Davis were that an alleged victim of domestic violence 
telephoned 911 and hung up.  When the 911 operator phoned back, she 
asked a series of questions, eliciting the allegation from the alleged victim 
 
80. Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Explanation as a “Firmly Rooted” 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 462 (1990) (“Theoretically, the 
excitement eliminates the witness’ capacity to reflect, thus precluding the ability to fabricate and 
ensuring an accurate, reliable description of the event perceived.”); see also Robert M. Hutchins & 
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 435-38 
(1928) (criticizing the notion that witnesses have no ability to fabricate once more than a few 
seconds has transpired after the startling event). 
81. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App. 2005) (involving a situation 
in which there was independent evidence that an alleged victim was hurt but what happened was 
established by a missing witness’ statements). 
82. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1220 (2002). 
83. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n.8 (1992). 
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that she was being assaulted at her home by the defendant.84  The operator 
was also told that the defendant left the home during the phone call.85  The 
complainant did not appear at trial and the 911 tape was played for the jury, 
who convicted the defendant.  The trial judge allowed the statements in as 
excited utterances,86 and the appeals court—hearing the case after Crawford 
was decided—affirmed the conviction. 
The Supreme Court upheld the use of the 911 tape at Mr. Davis’ trial 
despite the absence of the witness at trial.  The primary purpose of the 
questions posed by the operator, the Court found, objectively indicated that 
they were “to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency.”87  Where the 
primary purpose of police questioning is to allow police to meet an ongoing 
emergency, the statements made by the absent witness do not constitute 
witness testimony under the Sixth Amendment, and the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply. 
The Supreme Court noted that later portions of the Davis 911 tape 
might not have been primarily for emergency purposes, and urged future 
trial courts to redact portions of 911 calls when “circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary pur-
pose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially rele-
vant to later criminal prosecution.”88  Similarly, the Court deemed that 
statements taken by police officers should not have come in, but that their 
admission was harmless error.89  The Court distinguished the Davis facts 
from those in Crawford and set forth a variety of criteria that lower courts 
can use as a guide for deciding if evidence violates the Confrontation 
Clause when admitted in the absence of a witness at trial. 
B. THE DECISION IN THE APPEAL OF HAMMON V. INDIANA 
The other case decided by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington 
was Hammon v. Indiana.90  In Hammon, police officers interviewed an 
alleged victim at the scene following an emergency response phone call.  
 
84. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2271 (2006).  The operator asked for the first 
name then the last name and then the middle initial of the assailant. Id.   
85. Id. The exchange was as follows: “911 Operator: Okay. What’s his middle initial?  
Complainant: Martell.  He’s runnin’ now.” Id. 
86. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (indicating that excited utterances are alternatively referred to 
as spontaneous utterances or spontaneous declarations). 
87. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268-69. 
88. Id. at 2269. 
89. Id. at 2277-78. “That Court also concluded that, even if later parts of the call were 
testimonial, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Davis does not challenge 
that holding, and we therefore assume it to be correct.”  Id. 
90. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
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Police separated the alleged victim from the alleged assailant who was still 
in the house and asked the alleged victim to state what occurred before the 
officers arrived.  As in Davis, the alleged victim failed to appear at trial and 
the witness statements were repeated at trial by the interviewing officer. 
The Supreme Court reversed Mr. Hammon’s conviction, holding that 
the statements at issue were similar to those in Crawford and could not be 
introduced without the witness who made the statements testifying at trial 
under oath.91  Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious 
substitute for live testimony, “because they do precisely what a witness 
does on direct examination,” and are therefore covered by the Confrontation 
Clause.92 
C. THE AMBIGUITY IN DAVIS WILL HELP FUTURE PROSECUTORS 
Davis v. Washington must be understood as a retreat from the 
principles laid out in Crawford.  The Davis Court was asked to determine 
whether the statements in Davis and Hammon were “testimonial,” a word 
coined by Crawford to mean when a declarant of out-of-court statements 
counts as a “witness” for the Sixth Amendment right to confront the wit-
nesses against you.93  If an out-of-court statement repeated at trial is testi-
monial, then the declarant is a witness and must appear for cross-
examination unless the government has a reason that satisfies the Sixth 
Amendment.94  If the statement is nontestimonial then the Confrontation 
Clause does not even apply.95  Davis held that out-of-court statements 
repeated at trial must be deemed “testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate . . . that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”96  In contrast, statements repeated at trial must be deemed 
“nontestimonial” if they were “made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation . . . [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
 
91. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. Hammon was also remanded: “The Indiana courts may 
determine on remand whether a claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing—under which one who obtains 
a witness’s absence by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation—is properly 
raised in Hammon, and, if so, whether it is meritorious.  Absent such a finding, the Sixth 
Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon’s affidavit.” Id. at 2270. 
92. Id. at 2278. “Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for 
live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are 
inherently testimonial.” Id. 
93. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
94. Id. at 54-59. 
95. Id. at 56. 
96. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
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emergency.”97  That means that even if one person accuses another person 
of a crime, that initial accusation may serve as the basis to bring charges, 
hold the defendant before trial, and convict the defendant, if the police were 
engaged in resolving an emergency at the time the accusation was made.  It 
makes little sense that a person’s opportunity to cross-examine a witness 
rests not on whether the out-of-court statement serves to accuse the defen-
dant at trial, but on the police officer’s reason for gathering the statement in 
the first place.  It also makes little sense that a witness who lied to a police 
officer about a crime or the person who committed the crime need not 
affirm his accusation before the court if the lie was made to an emergency 
911 system, or if the police did not interrogate him.  The holding in Davis 
represents a dramatic retreat from the vision of the Confrontation Clause 
ensuring our long-standing tradition of “live testimony in court subject to 
adversarial testing.”98 
Davis is consciously ambiguous, declining to “produce an exhaustive 
classification of all conceivable statements” to determine whether the Con-
frontation Clause applies.99  Many questions remain in the aftermath of the 
Davis decision. Is the concept of an emergency broad or narrow?100  Is it an 
emergency when police need to find out whether an arrest should be made 
and whether the person they might arrest has a violent history or just 
behaved in a violent manner?  Who has the burden of showing that there is 
an ongoing emergency or that the emergency has ended?  Does the decision 
admit most 911 calls without the witness while barring statements taken at 
the scene?  Or does the application of the Confrontation Clause turn on how 
the missing witness phrases her phone call and how the police phrase their 
response at the scene? 
As ambiguous as the primary purpose test is standing alone, Davis 
lends it greater ambiguity by creating a test that is essentially a totality of 
the circumstances test.  The Court asks judges to consider a number of 
factors in deciding whether a statement to a police officer is testimonial.101  
The prongs of this test seem to have originated from state appellate court 
decisions that provided narrow interpretations of Crawford’s holding, rather 
than from any principled understanding of the purposes of the 
 
97. Id. at 2274.  
98. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 373-74). 
99. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268. 
100. Note that one of the amicus briefs in Davis used the term “safety concerns” rather than 
the term “ongoing emergency” to delineate when evidence fell outside of the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause. On its face, “ongoing emergency” suggest a narrower exception than “safety 
concerns” to the right to confront witnesses. 
101. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. 
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Confrontation Clause.102  As Scalia himself has said, totality of the circum-
stances tests leave too much discretion to lower court judges.103  Scalia 
wrote, “The common-law, discretion-conferring approach is ill suited, 
moreover, to a legal system in which the Supreme Court can review only an 
insignificant proportion of the decided cases.”104  “To adopt such an 
approach, in other words, is effectively to conclude that uniformity is not a 
particularly important objective with respect to the legal question at 
issue.”105 
In Section IV the reader will discover how appellate courts capitalized 
on the ambiguities of Crawford v. Washington to forego face-to-face con-
frontation, despite the strong wording in that opinion condemning trials by 
out-of-court accusation.  There is no reason to suppose that Davis’ ambigu-
ity supplies anything but encouragement to courts to continue allowing 
prosecutors to introduce out-of-court accusations without giving the 
accused the opportunity to test the credibility of the accuser through cross-
examination.  Indeed, the cases that have been decided in the year since 
Davis was published prove exactly that.106 
Robert Mosteller argued that confrontation rights were not assured as 
long as they relied on behavior by the police because the police could 
always alter their investigative techniques.107  Even before Davis, he 
predicted that police departments could change their methods of gathering 
information to help create evidence that would withstand a Sixth Amend-
ment challenge.108  Davis invites police to do so by allowing them to gather 
statements orally rather than in writing and by providing them an oppor-
tunity to characterize their questioning as part of an ongoing emergency 
investigation.  This article examines cases that were decided even before 
police had an opportunity to change their methods.  The cases discussed in 
 
102. See discussion infra section IV (discussing first responder cases). 
103. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-
80 (1989) (“Much better . . . to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in 
explanation of the decision.”). Id. at 1178. 
104. Id. at 1178 
105. Id. at 1179. 
[W]here an appellate judge says that the remaining issue must be decided on the basis 
of the totality of the circumstances, or by a balancing of all the factors involved, he 
begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a determiner of law.  To reach such a 
stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat . . . equality of treatment is 
difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered judicial system, impossible to achieve; 
predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is 
impaired. 
Id. at 1182. 
106. See infra discussion Section C (discussing the post-Davis decisions). 
107. Mosteller, supra note 32, at 529-30, 539-40, 543-44, 566-68. 
108. Id. at 538-40. 
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this article were investigated before Davis and Crawford and in many 
instances police had already testified about these investigations before they 
had an opportunity to conform their evidence to Crawford’s new 
Confrontation Clause ruling. 
This article also shows that an even larger problem than defining 
constitutional rights by the police’s investigatory actions is that courts can 
manipulate their findings.  Judges can take the totality of the circumstances 
test in Davis and conclude that the statements were taken as part of an 
ongoing investigation.  Plus, appellate courts must be deferential to the 
discretion of the trial judges since the trial judges heard the officers 
testify.109  Moreover, even when the appellate courts were interpreting the 
law, applying Crawford to domestic violence cases before Davis weakened 
the new jurisprudence and appellate courts were routinely finding ways to 
affirm convictions.110  The ambiguity in Davis, its focus on police practices, 
and its totality of the circumstances test all sound the bugle for retreat from 
confrontation rights for those charged with domestic violence. 
D. DAVIS USED LACK OF PRECEDENT IN CONTRADICTORY WAYS 
While Crawford used history to stress the importance of the Confron-
tation Clause, Davis used a lack of history in conflicting ways.  Crawford 
used history primarily to augment the idea of witnesses testifying at trial 
rather than having out-of court statements read to the factfinder.  For exam-
ple, the Court cited an early American case for the proposition that “it is a 
rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be 
prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”111  
This is similar to the Blackstone quotation: “The common-law tradition is 
one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.”112  Or this 
quote, reminding the reader that the Bill of Rights is rooted in distrust of 
government: “The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte 
 
109. See Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 815 (D.C. 2005) (noting that “[m]oreover, 
the trial judge’s assessment of the events is especially significant, for she heard the testimony first 
hand” and remanding the case for the trial judge to determine the circumstances under which the 
statements were made to decide if the Confrontation Clause applied); but see People v. Johnson, 
150 Cal. App. 1467, 1477-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“We independently review determinations 
affecting a defendant’s constitutional rights.”). 
110. See infra discussion Section IV (discussing the misinterpretation of Crawford’s 
ambiguity in first responder cases). 
111. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103, 104 
(Super. L. & Eq. 1794)).  Similarly, before the Confrontation Clause was adopted, the complaint 
at one state’s convention was that it was still not determined whether an accused “is to be allowed 
to confront the witnesses and have the advantage of cross examination.” Id. at 48. 
112. Id. at 43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 373-74). 
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testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was 
elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers.”113 
There was a contradiction within Davis regarding the significance of a 
lack of precedent connected to the seminal issue whether the Confrontation 
Clause affirmatively guarantees a method of presenting testimony or 
whether it only applies to abuses known to the Framers.114  In one section of 
the decision, the Court celebrated the lack of precedent as proof that the 
evidence was historically excluded from trials owing to the Confrontation 
Clause. 
We do not think it conceivable that the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-
taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the 
declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a deposition.  
Indeed, if there is one point for which no case-English or early 
American, state or federal-can be cited, that is it.115 
In this quote, the Davis Court affirmed Crawford’s pronouncement that 
unsworn statements are covered by the Confrontation Clause even if they 
were not an abuse considered by the Framers.116  The very fact that there 
was no prior case that discussed the application of the Sixth Amendment to 
unsworn statements as in Mr. Hammon’s case proved to the Davis Court 
that in the time of the Framers, these statements would not have been 
permitted.  The absence of case law here proved the breadth of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
In contrast, in another section of the decision, the Court celebrated the 
lack of precedent as proof that the evidence was historically admitted at 
trials, the very opposite conclusion from the quotation above.  The Court 
wrote: 
Davis seeks to cast McCottry [the caller] in the unlikely role of a 
witness by pointing to English cases.  None of them involves state-
ments made during an ongoing emergency.  In King v. Brasier, 1 
Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), for example, a young rape 
victim, “immediately on her coming home, told all the circum-
stances of the injury” to her mother. Id., at 200, 168 Eng. Rep., at 
202.  The case would be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement 
 
113. Id. at 66. 
114. Id. at 52 n.3. 
115. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006); see also id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court all but concedes that no case can be cited for its conclusion that the 
Confrontation Clause also applies to informal police questioning under certain circumstances.”). 
116. Id. 
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had been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being chased by her 
assailant. 
Here, the Court assumed that because appellate counsel did not find an 
early case that discussed whether the Sixth Amendment excluded hue and 
cry evidence, the early courts must have allowed in such evidence.  The 
Supreme Court found that the absence of case law proved the limits rather 
than the breadth of the Confrontation Clause in this instance.  The two 
quotations, therefore, indicate confusion about how to interpret a lack of 
history and a lack of precedent.  This confusion, in turn, makes it more 
difficult to interpret how Davis answered the question about whether the 
Confrontation Clause only addresses historic abuses or whether it also 
included new forms of abuses that are created as the rules of evidence shift.  
While Crawford stated that the Court would determine new abuses by de-
ciding what the Framers would have thought,117 Davis muddied this issue, 
helping to undue the broad protections announced just two years before. 
The main problem with limiting the Confrontation Clause to those 
modern practices with the closest kinship to abuses that the Framers thought 
of at the time, is that other evidence the Framers did not think about, such 
as excited utterances, may also serve to accuse the defendant and prejudice 
the defendant.  The more the term “testimonial” is limited, the more evi-
dence will be introduced without the opportunity to cross-examine the 
accusers.  The process mandated by the Clause will become a right to con-
front some accusers but not others.  For other accusations, there will be no 
opportunity to confront the accusers.  Judges, mistrusted by Crawford, 
again become the guardians of whether evidence is reliable enough to 
dispense with confrontation rights.118 
In another article, I argue that the term “testimonial” is defined 
improperly in Davis.119  In defining what is akin to testimony or 
“testimonial,” the Davis Court mistakenly examined how the evidence was 
 
117. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3. 
But even if, as [the Chief Justice] claims, a general bar on unsworn hearsay made 
application of the Confrontation Clause to unsworn testimonial statements a moot 
point, that would merely change our focus from direct evidence of original meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment to reasonable inference.  We find it implausible that a provision 
which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by 
unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK. 
Id. 
118. For example, in State v. Davis the court noted that it was the trial judge that decided in 
the first instance that the 911 call was reliable enough to be introduced, which allowed the 
government to present the caller’s accusation against Mr. Davis as testimony not subject to cross-
examination. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).  
119. Ross, supra note 4, at 198-200. 
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gathered rather than how the evidence was actually used at trial.120  The 
Sixth Amendment is a trial right.  The Confrontation Clause is not designed 
to discourage or prevent the police from investigating crimes in a manner 
that is consistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.  It does not prevent 
people from making true or false accusations outside of court.  What the 
Clause is designed to prevent is the government using these statements to 
establish that a person is guilty of a criminal charge without allowing the 
factfinder to view the declarant as he or she takes an oath, answers ques-
tions formally and submits to cross-examination.121 
One case from Ohio displays the problems of trusting judges to be 
gatekeepers of reliability and the danger posed by Davis’ narrow reading of 
Crawford. In State v. Byrd,122 police officers, responding to an altercation 
between a man and a woman, interviewed both and thought that the woman 
had started the fight.  The only reason the police did not arrest the woman 
was because the defendant interceded and begged them not to because she 
was pregnant.123  Since the police were bound by state law to make an arrest 
in domestic violence cases, they then arrested the man.124  Nevertheless, a 
judge determined that the woman’s statements to the 911 operator and to 
the police at the scene were reliable enough to dispense with cross-
examination and defendant was convicted without the opportunity to probe 
the declarant’s bias and credibility through cross-examination.125  The 
appellate court in Byrd reversed the conviction after Crawford was decided, 
holding that the statements at the scene were “testimonial,” but allowed the 
case to proceed on remand based upon the statements to the operator.126  
Thus, the government was allowed to try the defendant again based upon 
some of the witness’ statements without her having to appear.127  It is easy 
to imagine how a cross-examination of the caller could probe for bias and 
help the jury determine if the person claiming to be the victim was really 
the aggressor.  Instead, once the judge decides on remand that the witness 
provided reliable evidence to the operator, the jury may make a factual 
determination of the accuser’s credibility without having an opportunity to 
 
120. See id. (providing a more detailed explanation of this issue). 
121. Id. at 195-213. 
122. 828 N.E.2d 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).  Note that this was decided after Crawford but 
before Davis; however, Davis seems to support the resolution of the case.  Id. 
123. Id. at 134. 
124. Id. at 134-35. 
125. Id. at 135. 
126. Id. at 136-37. 
127. Id. at 137. “Lastly, under Evid. R. 803(2), the availability of the declarant is immaterial.  
Thus, it was of no consequence that the state did not call the female witness to testify and face 
cross-examination from the accused.” Id. 
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watch the witness answer questions on direct and cross-examination.  This 
scenario is likely to happen quite often after Davis. It is hardly the process 
envisioned by the majority in Crawford v. Washington. 
E. DAVIS SHRUNK CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION SO THAT THE 
CORE BECOMES THE PERIMETER 
The Davis Court used the term “core” in a most haphazard way.  The 
Court wrote, “We must decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause 
applies only to testimonial hearsay; and, if so, whether the recording of a 
911 call qualifies.”128  That sounds like it was asking whether Roberts 
survived Davis, a most important inquiry.  The Court answered that Roberts 
was dead, phrasing it this way: “A limitation so clearly reflected in the text 
of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its 
‘core,’ but its perimeter.”129  This is oddly phrased because the protection 
around the core would not be the old Roberts’ reliability jurisprudence 
anyway, but would be statements introduced at court whose introduction 
would start impinging upon core confrontation concerns.  Just as the 
Miranda rules protect the core of the Fifth Amendment, so would a rule 
preventing police from repeating accusations made to them protect the core 
purpose of confrontation rights annunciated in Crawford.  By using the 
word “core” to identify a perimeter, the Davis Court collapsed the broad 
possibilities of the term core in Crawford, and it did this incidentally, al-
most casually.  Instead of the term “core” inviting protections surrounding 
the core, the core became the circumference or perimeter of the scope of the 
clause. 
If statements made to law enforcement with the understanding that they 
would be used as testimony at trial could be deemed nontestimonial under 
the Davis test, then statements made to private persons would seem to be 
per force excluded from the right to confront one’s accusers.  Remember 
that Crawford stated that: “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a 
minimum to . . . the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”130  With Davis, the mini-
mum in fact became the maximum.  The Court decided that the Confron-
tation Clause is only concerned with modern practices with the closest 
kinship to the abuses of the past.131  The Supreme Court no longer imagined 
a comprehensive definition of “testimonial” as it did in Crawford, but only 
 
128. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). 
129. Id. 
130. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
131. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274. 
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one discreet definition.132  It would now be inconsistent for Crawford’s 
third possible definition to survive Davis, namely statements made to pri-
vate persons with the understanding that they would be used as testimony at 
trial.  In two years, the Court moved from Crawford’s proclamation that the 
Confrontation Clause is a “bedrock procedural guarantee” and “the com-
mon-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial 
testing” to the cryptic language in Davis quoted above, that a “limitation so 
clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be 
said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”133 
IV. FIRST RESPONDER CASES MISINTERPRET CRAWFORD’S 
AMBIGUITY 
Surprisingly, after Crawford, a majority of lower courts continued 
allowing out-of-court statements of witnesses through police testimony.  
They did so by interpreting the term “testimonial” in a narrow fashion so 
that the Sixth Amendment applied to only a handful of incriminating 
statements.  Instead of treating the existence of various possible definitions 
of core “testimonial” rights as an invitation to expand the rights of criminal 
defendants, these courts seized upon the ambiguity in Crawford as a reason 
to restrict the reach of the Confrontation Clause.  Sometimes, the Confron-
tation Clause was interpreted so narrowly that it would not even apply to 
the Crawford fact pattern.134 
In the wake of Crawford, courts in numerous jurisdictions held that 
Crawford did not prevent the government from introducing out-of-court 
statements made by an accuser to police to prove the charges without the 
opportunity for cross-examination.135  The post-Crawford, pre-Davis 
 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See discussion infra Section VI.A. (discussing that the test derives from a misreading of 
Crawford’s third possible core definition). 
135. See Chart in Appendix. The following cases affirmed convictions where statements 
given to the police at the scene were repeated without the witness testifying in person: 
Alaska: Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)  
Arizona: State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2005) 
Colorado: People v. King, 121 P.3d 234 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) 
D.C.: Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799 (D.C. 2005) 
Maine: State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004) 
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005) 
Michigan: People v. Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 
Minnesota: State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 2005) 
Nebraska: State v. Hambertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005) 
New York: New York v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 2004). For 911 cases, 
there was a split of opinion. Compare New York v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. 
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decisions can be divided into three lines of reasoning in reaching the 
conclusion that the excited utterance statements to police at issue are not 
“testimonial.” 
1. The “formality” rationale.  Only statements given to police 
officers during interrogation are formal enough to constitute 
“testimonial” statements; therefore, statements made at the 
scene of the crime are informal and not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause. [Section V below] 
2. The “state-of-mind” rationale.  Unless the declarant intends 
that the statements will be used at trial, statements given to po-
lice officers or private citizens do not constitute “testimonial” 
statements.  Some cases that read a “state-of-mind” require-
ment into Crawford opine that all excited utterances are 
exempt from the Confrontation Clause because by definition 
excited utterances are made without reflection so the speaker 
could not have intended that the statements be used to 
prosecute the accused. [Section VI below] 
3. The “intent-of-the-officers” rationale.  This set of cases looks 
at the intent of the officers in asking questions of the witness to 
determine what constitutes interrogation.  Information gathered 
as part of an emergency response falls outside the dictates of 
the Confrontation Clause. [Section VII below] 
The chart in Appendix A indicates that out of the thirty-two states that 
have developed a theory in response to Crawford, thirty of these states have 
interpreted Crawford narrowly, to exempt accusatory statements introduced 
at domestic violence trials from the scope of the Confrontation Clause.136  
 
2004) (illustrating a narrow reading of testimonial under state-of-mind rational) with 
People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. 2004) (illustrating a broad reading of 
testimonial). 
North Carolina: North Carolina  v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
This case was granted certiorari, judgment vacated and remanded for further 
proceedings when the Court decided Davis. 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006).  
Ohio: Ohio v. Mills, 2006 WL 1132543 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
Tennessee: State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 352 (Tenn. 2006). 
Texas: Key v. Texas, 173 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. 2005). 
Washington: State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990 (Wash. 2005). 
Wisconsin: Wisconsin v. Searcy, 709 N.W.2d 497 (Wis. 2005). 
136. Two courts have taken a broad view of the Confrontation Clause, Georgia and Hawaii. 
Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. 2004); State v. Grace, 111 P.2d 28, 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 
2005).  In addition to the cases mentioned in supra note 135, the following cases have also 
interpreted Crawford narrowly.  People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 846 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
2004); State v. Johnson, 2005 WL 1952939 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005); Bartee v. Florida, 922 So.2d 
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Although all three rationales gather support from the language in Crawford, 
this article will demonstrate that all three theories were incorrect interpre-
tations of the seminal decision and missed the policy behind the Crawford 
holding.137  The following sections will review these rationales one by one 
and discuss whether they survived the Davis decision. 
 
1065 (Fla. 2006); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. 2005) (“M.M.’s statement to Officer 
Harrell at Jackson’s house is not testimonial in nature.  When the officer arrived at Jackson’s 
house, she did so in response to a ‘call for help’ and the ‘questions posed by the officer were 
preliminary in nature and for the purpose of attending to M.M.’s medical concerns.”); Talley v. 
State, 2005 WL 387443, *3 (Ky. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (“A 911 call does not implicate the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed” and is therefore “not a testimonial 
statement.”); State v. Jefferson, 922 So.2d 577, 598 (La. 2005) (agreeing with the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota that “it would be an exceptional occasion with a statement made by a caller during 
the course of a 911 call would be classified as testimonial.”); State v. Mann, 2005 WL 2714531, 
*4 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2005) (“Statements made on a 911 tape are not made under ‘circumstances 
that would cause a reasonable witness to believe they could be used at trial’”); Salt Lake City v. 
Williams, 128 P.3d 47, 53-54 (Utah 2005) (finding that statement made to a 911 dispatcher was 
nontestimonial because it was “made while the incident was occurring and during a call placed to 
911 for the purpose of seeking protection from immediate danger.”); Hammon v. Indiana, 829 
N.E.2d 444, 458 (Ind. 2005) (“Officer Mooney, responding to a reported emergency, was 
principally in the process of accomplishing the preliminary task of securing and assessing the 
scene.  Amy’s motivation was to convey basic facts and there was no suggestion that Amy wanted 
her initial responses to be preserved or otherwise used against her husband at trial”).  In addition, 
the following non-domestic violence cases are included in the chart because their reasoning fits 
within the mold of the domestic violence reasoning and provides precedent. See State v. Greene, 
874 A.2d 750, 775 (Conn. 2005) 
[W]here a victim contacts a police officer immediately following a criminal incident to 
report a possible injury and the officer receives information or asks questions to ensure 
that the victim receives proper medial attention and that the crime scene is properly 
secured, the victim’s statements are not testimonial in nature because “they can be 
seen as part of the criminal incident itself, rather than as part of the prosecution that 
follows.” 
Id.; South Carolina v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 785 (S.C. 2005) (considering post-Crawford 
domestic violence cases for definitions of testimonial). 
137. Crawford provides three possible definitions of core “testimonial” rights: 
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially,” “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
“testimonial” materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions,” “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial[.]”  These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the 
Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.  Regardless of the precise 
articulation, some statements qualify under any definition—for example, ex parte 
testimony at a preliminary hearing. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
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V. FORMALITY RATIONALE CASES WERE WRONGLY DECIDED 
UNDER CRAWFORD 
Many courts interpreted Crawford to apply Sixth Amendment protec-
tions only to formal police questioning and not to informal statements given 
to police.138  These decisions permitted the police to recite what the alleged 
victim told them under the excited utterance exception without the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, holding that this informal type of 
hearsay was not “testimonial” and therefore there was no right to confront 
the declarant.139 
Hammon v. Indiana, the case reversed by the Supreme Court in Davis 
v. Washington, was one of the early and influential decisions that used the 
formality rationale.140  Hammon’s reasoning was widely adopted by other 
jurisdictions.  Many jurisdictions specifically cited to the Indiana appeals 
court decision,141 while other jurisdictions used the same formality logic.142  
 
138. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Alaska 2005) (“We have reviewed 
numerous decisions which have interpreted Crawford. The great majority of courts which have 
considered this question have concluded that an excited utterance by a crime victim to a police 
officer, made in response to minimal questioning, is not ‘testimonial.’”). See also State v. 
Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a majority of post-Crawford 
cases involving initial police-victim interactions at the scene held that the situations did not 
involve interrogation and that resulting statements were not “testimonial”). 
139. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 506 (6th Cir. 2005).  The 
nontestimonial nature of those statements to the police was demonstrated by (1) the statements 
being “made within only a few short minutes after Defendant” and his wife were involved in a 
domestic dispute; (2) the “police intervention was initiated by someone within the Hadley 
residence,” and not by the authorities or by the wife; (3) “when the police arrived at the residence, 
Mrs. Hadley [the wife] immediately emerged and blurted out the challenged statements without 
any questioning or prompting whatsoever;” and (4) “her statements were not overly detailed or 
‘testimonial’ in nature but were limited to the information necessary for the police officers to 
address the immediate exigencies of the situation.”  Id. 
140. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d by 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 
2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Hammon is sometimes 
referred to as Hammon-Fowler. See, e.g., Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. 2005). 
Hammon and Fowler use the same reasoning and apply identical language in part and they were 
written by the same judge (on behalf of different panels of the court) and were released the same 
day.  Stancil, 866 A.2d at 809 n.20.  
141. The following cases cite Hammon or Fowler (two overlapping opinions of the Indiana 
Supreme Court): Rogers v. State, 814 N.E.2d 695 (Ind. 2004); Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. 
2004); United States v. Webb, 2004 WL 2726100, at *3-5 (D.C. Super); State v. Alvarez, 107 
P.3d 350, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005); People v. King, 121 P.3d 234, 239-40 (Colo. 2005); State v. Veesenmeyer, 2005 WL 
623277, at *3 (Minn. App. 2005); Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 355 (Alaska 2005); Davis v. 
State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2005); State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 482-83 (Neb. 2005); 
People v. King, 7 Misc. 3d 1028A, at *9 (N.Y. 2005); City of Akron v. Hutton, 2005 WL 1523880 
(Ohio 2005); Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. 2005); People v. Nieves, 8 Misc. 3d 
1020(A), at *2 (N.Y. 2005); State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 995 (Wash. 2005); United States v. 
Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 505-06 (6th Cir. 2005). 
142. See full chart in Appendix.  For example:  
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The facts in Hammon were that a police officer responded to a domestic 
disturbance call and spoke to the alleged victim, asking if there was a 
problem.  When she said no, he brought her to another room, away from the 
defendant where she described how the defendant had punched her and 
thrown her down.143  Those statements were admitted into evidence without 
the witness taking the stand because the trial judge found that the state-
ments were admissible as excited utterances despite some time delay be-
tween the alleged incident and the time of the statement.144 
The appeals court affirmed the admissibility of the statements as 
excited utterances and concluded that Crawford’s new jurisprudence did not 
apply to these facts.  The Indiana appeals court distinguished Hammon from 
Crawford by focusing on the ways in which the questioning at issue was 
less formal than in Crawford.145  In Hammon, the court noted that the 
 
Alaska: Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Alaska 2005) (determining that an 
officer’s question to the declarant of “What happened?,” did not seem to fall within 
the category of formal, official, and systematic questioning” and the statement that the 
defendant hit him with a pipe was therefore not testimonial); 
Maine: State v. Barnes, 54 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004) (refusing to characterize a statement 
as “testimonial” unless it meets a restrictive definition of interrogation as “structured 
police questioning.” Nontestimonial even though declarant drove herself to police 
station to report her son threatened to kill her.); 
Washington: State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 995 (Wash. 2005) (“Although D.L.’s 
statements were made in response to questioning by a police officer, Officer Gray’s 
minimal questioning was not an ‘interrogation’ as Crawford contemplated.”). 
Third Circuit: United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (Title III 
wiretap recordings are not “testimonial” statements for purposes of Crawford in part 
because (1) the recorded conversations neither fell within nor were analogous to any 
of the specific examples of “testimonial” statements mentioned by the Crawford 
Court; and (2) each of the examples referred to by the Crawford Court or the 
definitions it considered entails a formality to the statement absent from the recorded 
statements in Hendricks.) 
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2005) (The non-
testimonial nature of those statements to the police was demonstrated by (1) the 
statements being made within only a few short minutes after defendant and his wife 
had engaged in a domestic dispute; (2) the police intervention was initiated by 
someone within the residence, and not by the authorities or by the wife herself; (3) 
when the police arrived at the residence, the wife immediately emerged and blurted 
out the challenged statements without any questioning or prompting whatsoever; and 
(4) her statements were not overly detailed or “testimonial” in nature but were limited 
to the information necessary for the police officers to address the immediate 
exigencies of the situation.). 
Ninth Circuit: Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 831 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining 
that when police responded to 911 calls, a victim’s statements were admissible 
because she “was in no way being interrogated by the police”). 
143. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 947. 
144. Id. at 949. 
145. Id. at 952. Hammon also addressed the state-of-mind issue, but was much briefer in that 
analysis.  Id. at 952-53 (“An unrehearsed statement made without time for reflection or delibera-
tion, as required to be an ‘excited utterance,’ is ‘not testimonial’ in that such a statement, by 
definition, has not been made in contemplation of its use in a future trial.”). 
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interview did not take place in a police station, and instead of conducting a 
lengthy, structured interview the police asked questions such as “what 
happened.”146  The Indiana court concluded that statements given to police 
with “minimal questioning” are not the formal interrogations encompassed 
by the Crawford decision. 
One can certainly follow the logic of Hammon and its progeny.  
Indeed, there is something formal in the term “interrogation” as opposed to 
police “questioning.”  Nevertheless, the formality rationale misreads Craw-
ford.  First, it makes no sense on a policy level that a person’s right to 
confront an accuser only applies if the accusations repeated in court were 
initially gathered in a particular manner.  In Hammon’s case, he was tried 
and convicted based on out-of-court evidence, “prejudiced by evidence 
which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”147  These formality cases 
limited Crawford to its facts, where there was in fact a formal police inter-
rogation, ignoring the thrust of Crawford that conveyed a sweeping change 
in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  Moreover, the formality rationale was 
specifically contradicted by other language in the Crawford opinion.  The 
sections below will address the faulty logic of reading a formality test into 
the Crawford opinion. 
A. Limiting the Confrontation Clause to statements formally taken 
ignores other language in the majority opinion that indicates 
that statements to police outside of the formal setting of the 
police station also constitute “testimonial” statements. 
B. The formality rationale misinterprets Justice Scalia’s use of 
historical background to erroneously conclude that Crawford 
did not prevent new abuses of the Confrontation Clause but 
only abuses that were deeply rooted in history.  Because the 
Confrontation Clause is designed to create formality in the 
manner evidence is presented to a jury, it is illogical to con-
clude that less formality satisfies the constitution. 
C. The formality theory is in conflict with the evidentiary theory 
that excited utterances are deeply rooted in this nations’ 
history. 
A. IGNORING BROAD HINTS IN CRAWFORD’S FOOTNOTES 
Crawford was self-consciously opaque about why it chose the term 
“interrogation” except that the out-of-court testimony in Mr. Crawford’s 
 
146. Id. at 952. 
147. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 
Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)). 
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trial happened to come from a police interrogation.  The Court flaunted the 
decision’s ambiguity, writing: “Just as various definitions of ‘testimonial’ 
exist, one can imagine various definitions of ‘interrogation,’ and we need 
not select among them in this case.”148  However, the opinion did drop an 
important footnote.  In footnote four, Justice Scalia gave a broad hint that 
statements outside the police station are testimonial.  “We use the term 
‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense” the 
Court advises. 149 
To arrive at their formality requirement, courts have had to ignore or 
twist Scalia’s admonishment that the term “interrogation” is to be under-
stood “in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.”150  Instead of 
dissuading Hammon from its conclusion that informal statements to police 
officers fall outside of Crawford’s holding, courts have twisted the term 
“colloquial” to support a formality requirement.  Since the dictionary 
defines “interrogation” as “[t]o examine by questioning formally or offi-
cially,” the court in Hammon concluded that the lay conception or 
“colloquial sense” of “interrogation” required formality.151  In fact, the 
court reasoned that lay conceptions of interrogation may be even more 
formal than the dictionary definition because television shows portray 
stationhouse interviews as structured formal interviews.152 
It makes no sense to interpret the words “colloquial sense” to mean a 
formal sense.  One of the antonyms of the term “colloquial” in the diction-
ary is the term “formal.”153  Thus colloquial is the opposite of formal.154  
This shows how far lower courts have gone to avoid having to grant 
constitutional protections to criminal defendants, at least where an opinion 
 
148. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
149. Id. at 53 (“Just as various definitions of “testimonial” exist, one can imagine various 
definitions of “interrogation,” and we need not select among them in this case. Sylvia’s recorded 
statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any 
conceivable definition.). 
150. Id. 
151. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948. 
152. See id. (declaring that “a lay conception of police ‘interrogation’ bolstered by 
television . . . [would encompass] an interview in a room at the stationhouse”). 
153.  Thesaurus.com, http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/colloquial (last visited Nov. 20, 
2007). The antonym for colloquial lists “correct” then “formal,” followed by other words.  Id.  
154. Most likely, the Crawford majority uses the description “colloquial sense” to distinguish 
the term from the formal definition of interrogation used in Miranda jurisprudence. Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 53 n.4.  The police questioning at issue in Crawford was a formal, custodial interrogation.  
Id. at 66.  If Justice Scalia intended the term “interrogation” to be read in a formal sense, he would 
not have needed to have written any description about how the term was to be interpreted.  Hence, 
Justice Scalia could not have meant a “colloquial” understanding of “interrogation” to be a 
narrow, limited definition referring primarily to custodial or custodial-like interrogations.  It 
would be illogical for Justice Scalia to write that he intended the term to be interpreted in a less 
technical sense if he meant it to apply to the facts of Crawford and no further.  
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seems to invite them to draw their own conclusions about the meaning of 
different terms. 
In addition to the “colloquial sense” reference, the decision offered 
another broad hint that statements given to police in less formal settings are 
“testimonial” and, therefore, subject to Sixth Amendment protections.  In 
footnote eight, the Court wrote that White v. Illinois was “arguably in 
tension with the rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination 
when the proffered statement is testimonial.”155  White v. Illinois was the 
only Supreme Court case to deal with the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule in the context of the Sixth Amendment, and here the Court was 
calling it into question.  In White, an investigating officer came to the home 
of a child victim and took a statement from her that was later used in court 
under the excited utterance or spontaneous declaration exception to the 
hearsay rule.156  It was the very type of excited utterance exception at issue 
in Hammon.157  There was nothing in the White opinion or in Crawford’s 
discussion of White to suggest that the questioning in White constituted 
formal police interrogation.  Nothing that a court would say resembled an 
inquiry before King James’s Privy Council.  Not only did the interview take 
place in the home, but one would expect police officers to be less formal 
when questioning a child.  If Crawford called White into question then for-
mality should not determine the scope of the Confrontation Clause.  
Surprisingly, the Indiana appeals court never mentioned this spontaneous 
utterance footnote. Hammon and its progeny ignore Crawford’s broad hints 
in footnotes four and eight that almost all statements to police constitute 
“testimonial” statements and simply cherry pick the language that supports 
the conclusion that informal questioning falls outside the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
B. HISTORIC APPROACH IN THE OPINION SUPPORTS EXPANSIVE 
CONFRONTATION RIGHT 
The formality conclusion reached by the courts was bound up with the 
historical detail that pervaded the Crawford opinion.  The Indiana appeals 
court backed up its formal reading of the term “interrogation” in Hammon 
by pointing to the other types of possible core “testimonial” statements 
discussed in Crawford, much of which detailed historical abuses.  For 
 
155. Id. at 58. 
156. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1992). 
157. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.  The only issue that White addressed is whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires a declarant to be unavailable before the government is permitted to introduce 
firmly rooted hearsay that would be admissible under the Roberts’ framework. White, 502 U.S. at 
349. 
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example, the Indiana court stated that the complainant’s “oral statement was 
not given in a formal setting even remotely resembling an inquiry before 
King James I’s Privy Council.”158  The Indiana appeals court read Crawford 
to mean that the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with the evils 
contemplated by the founders.  In other words, since the Framers did not 
expect anything as informal as an excited utterance to be used as the basis 
for prosecuting someone in the end of the eighteenth century, then this was 
not one of the evils contemplated by the Framers.  However, it will be 
shown that this was not how the Crawford opinion viewed new abuses of 
the Confrontation Clause. 
Crawford proffered three possible definitions of testimonial: (1) ex 
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent, “such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony;” (2) extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized “testimonial” materials; and (3) statements made 
under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe that the 
statements would be available for use at a later trial.159  The first definition 
used formal examples, the second was expressly formal, and only the third 
definition was non-formal. The abuses described in the opinion—sworn 
affidavits and depositions—are more formal because Justice Scalia was 
describing the abuses prevalent in England in the eighteenth century and 
earlier.160 
In 1791, when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, the prosecution 
would not have tried to introduce the excited utterance statements to the 
police without opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, both because the 
excited utterance is a newer invention and because even when hearsay was 
allowed in, the conviction could not be based upon hearsay evidence.161  
 
158. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
159. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52: 
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex 
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such 
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions, statements that were made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .  These formulations 
all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various 
levels of abstraction around it.  Regardless of the precise articulation, some 
statements qualify under any definition—for example, ex parte testimony at 
a preliminary hearing. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
160. Id. at 44. 
161. White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring).  “[O]ut-of-court statements made by someone other than the accused and not 
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Informal out-of-court statements were generally not introduced in early 
trials as the basis upon which to convict, historians have noted.162  Hence, 
these out-of-court statements at trial were not likely to be one of the evils 
contemplated at the time of the founding.163 
Should modern courts determine the scope of the Confrontation Clause 
by what the Framers intended trials to look like, or should the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause be determined by what abuses the founders were 
afraid might be imposed?  This lies at the heart of the disagreement over 
formality requirements.  If the Supreme Court intended to limit the reach of 
the Sixth Amendment only to those abuses practiced in England before the 
signing of the Sixth Amendment, then less formal hearsay such as excited 
utterances would not be included.164  This position represents Justice 
Thomas’ viewpoint, as memorialized in his 1992 concurrence in White v. 
Illinois and later in his separate opinion in Davis.165  The Crawford opinion 
actually took a stand on whether the Court meant to prohibit only what the 
Framers knew was a threat, or whether the Clause prohibited what the 
Framers would have prohibited had they known it would come to pass.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia refused to limit the Confrontation 
Clause to abuses known or thought about at the time: 
But even if, as he[,] [the Chief Justice,] claims, a general bar on 
unsworn hearsay made application of the Confrontation Clause to 
unsworn “testimonial” statements a moot point, that would merely 
change our focus from direct evidence of original meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment to reasonable inference.  We find it implausible 
that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex 
parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly 
 
taken under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not considered 
substantive evidence upon which a conviction could be based.”  Id. 
162. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 30 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §6342, 22 n.7 (1997 & Supp. 2006).  
163. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure.”); see also Mosteller, supra note 32, at 569 
(“The hearsay rule of that time did not have the ready exceptions available today.”). 
164. See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” In The Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. 
Washington, Noah Webster, And Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 182 (2006) 
(rejecting Crawford’s “dubious” assertion that the Confrontation Clause “is most naturally read as 
a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding” (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (2004)). 
165. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (1992) (Thomas, J. concurring in part); see also Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2281-82 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Note that in Crawford, the second possible core definition (out of three possible core 
definitions) sets forth Justice Thomas’ definition: “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
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OK.  Any attempt to determine the application of a constitutional 
provision to a phenomenon that did not exist at the time of its 
adoption (here, allegedly, admissible unsworn testimony) involves 
some degree of estimation--what [the Chief Justice] calls use of a 
“proxy,” post, at 1375--but that is hardly a reason not to make the 
estimation as accurate as possible.  Even if, as [the Chief Justice] 
mistakenly asserts, there were no direct evidence of how the Sixth 
Amendment originally applied to unsworn testimony, there is no 
doubt what its application would have been.166 
This quotation from Crawford lays to rest any doubt that the majority 
intended the Confrontation Clause to bar hearsay that was too informal to 
have been admissible in common law England.167  The Framers would have 
focused on unsworn testimony as the Chief Justice noted in his dissent, 
since unsworn testimony was not permitted even in the civil-law ex parte 
examinations of England, the primary horrors that the Framers addressed by 
the Clause.168  In this quotation, Justice Scalia explained that whether the 
government introduced or did not introduce unsworn statements during the 
founding era was immaterial to the question of the scope of the Confron-
tation Clause.169  The question should be what the application of the clause 
would have been at the time of the founders. Thus, although the formality 
language derived from the formal abuses described possible definitions of 
testimonial statements, the notion that the clause is only interested in abuses 
perpetrated in the past flies in the face of this specific reasoning in 
Crawford. 
There is little doubt that a government official who tried to introduce 
an unsworn, unwritten statement into a trial based on the witness being 
excited by an event, would have found that the Confrontation Clause barred 
the statement.  Again we see the lower courts cherry picking the language 
that supports their conclusion and ignoring the reasoning within the 
Crawford decision. 
C. THE NOTION THAT EXCITED UTTERANCES ARE TOO RECENT TO 
CONSTITUTE HISTORIC ABUSES CONTRADICTS THE EVIDENTIARY 
THEORY OF DEEPLY ROOTED HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 
Reading Crawford as only prohibiting historic abuses creates an 
unintended irony in the area of excited utterances.  The formality rationale 
 
166. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 70; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. 
169. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3. 
       
2007] CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION 423 
excludes excited utterances from the scope of testimonial evidence because 
excited utterances are not deemed deeply rooted enough to qualify as the 
abuses with which the founders were concerned. Before Crawford, courts 
admitted excited utterances precisely because they were viewed as “deeply 
rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rules.170  “Deeply rooted” exceptions 
were deemed inherently reliable under Roberts’ reasoning, and therefore 
admissible without face-to-face confrontation.  Under Roberts, courts need 
not question the specific reliability of these statements once a trial judge 
qualified them as excited utterances.171  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Washington in Davis noted approvingly, “the Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court properly classified the 911 call as an excited utterance, which is a 
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and thus satisfies the require-
ment of reliability.”172  By firmly rooted, the Washington Supreme Court 
meant that it had historical roots.173  Hence, excited utterances are deeply 
rooted under evidence law, but not rooted enough to be deemed “testi-
monial” by courts that side with Justice Thomas’ view of the clause that it 
should only apply to abuses contemplated by the Framers of the Sixth 
Amendment.174 
Thanks to dicta in Crawford, courts are now recognizing that the 
excited utterance exception has expanded so much that it cannot really be 
considered deeply rooted.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
Stancil v. United States was concerned with “the apparent expansion in 
recent years of the kinds of statements which fall under the rubric of the 
hearsay exception for excited utterances.”175  The District of Columbia 
 
170. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004) 
(holding that hearsay statement made at the hospital to police that defendant had cut him was not 
“testimonial” because the interview was unstructured, informal, and unrecorded).  “The hearsay 
exception for spontaneous statements is firmly rooted.”  Id. at 851 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 355, 
n.8 (1992)); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (citing the excited utterance as an 
example of such trustworthy hearsay). 
171. White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8. 
172. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005). 
173. Id.; see also White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8 (“There can be no doubt that the two exceptions 
we consider in this case are ‘firmly rooted.’  The exception for spontaneous declarations is at least 
two centuries old.”). 
174. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); White, 
502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
175. Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. 2005). Note that Stancil was vacated 
for rehearing.  In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 1186, 1187 (D.C. 2005). 
[T]he majority of the judges of this court has voted to grant the petition for rehearing 
en banc, it is FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc in 
appeal no. 03-CM-444 is granted.  It is FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, that 
appeal no. 03-CM-605, which was argued before a division on June 7, 2005, is hereby 
consolidated with appeal no. 03- CM-444, for argument and the Clerk shall schedule 
these matters for argument in tandem before the court sitting en banc for the month of 
October. 
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Court of Appeals wrote that historically, excited utterance statements were 
admissible if they were “practically reflex actions . . . or images of the 
contents of the brain . . . likely to be made without any calculation as to 
their potential effect and without regard to their possible consequences.”176  
Historically, Stancil noted that the statement must be contemporaneous with 
the startling event and would not have included responses to police 
questioning.177  This does not mean that courts such as Stancil wish to 
rethink admitting these hearsay statements as excited utterances.  Rather, 
the lower courts wish to use this fact against the criminal defendants since it 
follows that excited utterances would not have been the abuses the founders 
had in mind when they adopted the Confrontation Clause.  Ironies aside, the 
fact that the excited utterance is not deeply rooted cuts two ways.  That 
certain hearsay evidence was not admitted in the years after the Sixth 
Amendment was ratified is a fairly good indicator that the Confrontation 
Clause barred that type of evidence, or at least indicates that the Framers 
would have found it objectionable to substitute excited out-of-court 
statements for sworn in-court testimony. 
The appellant’s brief in Davis argued that there was no excited 
utterance exception in the Framers’ time, there was only res gestae; as soon 
as the statement became descriptive of something that happened in the past, 
it fell outside of the exception.178  Davis’ appellate brief to the Supreme 
Court described the “hue and cry” of victims to local constables or bailiffs 
as the forerunners of 911 calls.179  Davis’ appellants argued that the fact that 
the evidence rules precluded “hue and cry” evidence from getting before the 
jury proved that the Confrontation Clause applied to these early oral 
accusations.180  Since the Framers interpreted the Sixth Amendment as 
precluding “hue and cry” evidence, Davis argued, this Court must likewise 
 
Id.  As this article went to press no further action was taken. 
176. Stancil, 866 A.2d at 811. 
177. Id. (citing Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep 179 (K.B. 1694); Packet Co. 
v. Clough, 87 U.S. 528, 542 (1874)). 
178. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 23-24.  Note that the brief does not state the source 
of this assertion.  Id.  Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, n.8 (2004) (citing Thompson, 90 
Eng. Rep.). Note that Thompson was a civil case, so the clause was not an issue. 
179. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 23-24 (citing 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA 
PLACITORUM CORONAE: A HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98-100 (1st Am. ed. 1847)).  
180. See Graham, The Right to Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh 
Loses Another One , 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 104 (1972) (“[T]he Court never made clear when it 
relied on the common-law hearsay rule and when its decision was based on the constitutional right 
of confrontation” before the right was held binding on the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment (until the Supreme Court made the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
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hold that the Sixth Amendment precludes the modern day hue and cry, 
namely, the 911 call and other oral statements to police. 
If Crawford is understood to return our courts to a system of live 
testimony rather than repeated statements, then the historical recency of this 
hearsay exception actually negates the argument that formality is key to 
whether evidence is “testimonial.”  As scholar Richard Friedman argues, 
the Framers wanted formality when they required that witnesses take the 
stand and answer questions under oath.181  In his Supreme Court brief in 
Hammon, Friedman argued that this history of formality requirements at the 
time of the founding of this country means that courts misinterpret 
Crawford when they read a formality requirement into the definition of 
“testimonial.”182 
It is impossible to square this seminal decision with the restrictive 
formality requirement imposed by so many lower courts that construed 
Crawford.  By selectively choosing language that suggests formality, lower 
courts turn a blind eye to the irony in holding that the Confrontation Clause 
welcomes informal out-of-court statements to substitute for live witnesses 
who answer questions under oath based on the fact that such a trial by 
hearsay accusation would never have occurred to the Framers. 
D. DOES FORMALITY SURVIVE THE SUPREME COURT’S DAVIS 
DECISION? 
This section set forth several reasons why Crawford should not be read 
to limit the term testimonial to formal statements.  If unsworn statements 
are as bad, if not worse, as sworn statements, how can formality be a factor 
in determining whether a statement is testimonial?  Such a reading ignores 
footnote four where the Court uses the term “colloquial” to describe the 
type of interrogation it envisions, and most importantly, it ignores the edict 
to construe the Sixth Amendment so that it conforms to what the Framers 
would have thought had the evidence been introduced were they transported 
into the future.183  There is positively no evidence that the Framers 
preferred informal evidence over formal evidence; on the contrary, there is 
evidence that formal evidence was preferred for witnesses testifying against 
 
181. As scholar Richard Friedman argued, what history is known suggests that the Framers 
valued formality when they required that witness take the stand and answer questions under oath. 
Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 24, at 1025;  Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the 
Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 269 (2005) [hereinafter Friedman, 
Grappling] (“Formality is an ideal, an aspect of testimony given in the optimal way.”). 
182. See Friedman, Grappling, supra note 181, at 269. 
183. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3 (looking at what “application” of the Clause “would 
have been” had an issue arisen at the time of the founding of this country and not “how the Sixth 
Amendment originally applied.”).  
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a defendant.  In truth, the formality prong established in Davis contradicts 
Crawford’s broad mandate for accusers to come to court where the fact-
finder may judge the credibility and relevance of the evidence by observing 
the witness testify.184 
Davis is confusing because it both adopts formality and rejects it.  The 
Supreme Court appeared to have rejected formality for it reversed Hammon 
v. Indiana, a lower court decision built primarily upon the formality frame-
work.185  The Court decided that the statements made by the complaining 
witness in Hammon were “testimonial” even though they took place at a 
kitchen table rather than at a police station and even though they were not 
recorded.186  Although the police officer did not use structured questioning 
in Hammon, Davis held that Mrs. Hammon’s statements were “testi-
monial.”187  On the other hand, it would be premature to assert that Justice 
Thomas’ formality viewpoint is dead.  Despite reversing Hammon, the 
Supreme Court presents formality as one criterion it considered when 
differentiating the statements in Davis v. Washington from those in 
Crawford.188  Comparing the demeanor of the absent witness in Davis, Ms. 
McCottry, to the demeanor of the absent witness in Crawford at the time 
they initially made their statements against their significant others, the 
Court draws a connection between their demeanor and the formality of the 
questioning. 
Finally, the difference in the level of formality is striking.  
Crawford calmly answered questions at a station house, with an 
officer-interrogator taping and taking notes, while McCottry’s 
frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment 
that was not tranquil, or even safe.  Thus, the circumstances of her 
interrogation objectively indicate that its primary purpose was to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.189 
Formality lives on as a prong upon which to compare testimonial with 
nontestimonial statements.  The less formal the statement, the more likely 
that its primary purpose was to enable police to meet an ongoing emer-
gency.  As you can see from the quotation above, the formality in Davis is 
 
184. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004) 
185. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006). 
186. Id. at 2273. 
187. Id. at 2275. 
188. Id. at 2278 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial 
utterance.”)  Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Supreme Court denied that formality was 
essential to returning the Confrontation Clause to its original meaning. Id. at 2276.  “But the 
English cases that were the progenitors of the Confrontation Clause did not limit the exclusionary 
rule to prior court testimony and formal depositions.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
189. Id. at 2269. 
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intertwined with the demeanor of the witness.  The same frantic nature that 
qualified the statement as an excited utterance now qualified it as a nontes-
timonial utterance.  This makes it possible for lower courts to conclude that 
virtually all excited utterances fall outside the scope of the confrontation 
right.190 
Davis is also inconsistent in how it evaluates how formal police offi-
cers or police agents were in gathering testimony.  The statements in Davis 
that the Court deemed nontestimonial were in fact more formal than those 
in Hammon that the Court deemed testimonial.  In Davis, the statements at 
issue were recorded while in Hammon the statements were not recorded.  It 
was not even clear whether the officer in Hammon took notes while gather-
ing the statements.191  Although the operator in Davis asked a multitude of 
questions to obtain the statements at issue, it is not clear that the officers in 
Hammon asked anything beyond a simple “what happened?”192  Never-
theless, the Supreme Court gave weight to the informal nature of the 
questioning in Davis while rejecting the relevance of the informal nature of 
the questioning in Hammon.193 
By creating confusion in Davis over the role of formality in 
determining the application of the Confrontation Clause the Supreme Court 
creates an opportunity for lower courts to continue to apply the formality 
prong in a manner that helps them reach the result they wish.  We have seen 
how the ambiguity in Crawford over formality was used to restrict the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause.  Again, after Davis, we can expect 
courts to continue to use formality as a rationale for distinguishing future 
statements from those in Crawford and Hammon.  While it no longer will 
be the sole basis for denying confrontation rights, formality will continue to 
be a method for lower courts to conclude that statements are not 
testimonial.194 
Formality was created by the lower courts to distinguish the facts in 
Crawford from other fact patterns.  These lower courts wrongly decided, 
missing the policy behind Crawford for extending confrontation rights to 
modern day trials. Davis then adopted this language in its reasoning.  
Hence, we see the dragging effect that the state courts had on the Supreme 
 
190. See infra note 198 and accompanying text (“Some early cases interpreted Crawford as 
excluding all excited utterances from. . .”). 
191. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2275. 
192. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005). 
193. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268, 2275. 
194. See, e.g., State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 275 (Or. 2006) (“Finally, we consider the 
‘level of formality’ of the 9-1-1 call.  Here, as in Davis, Carders answers to the 9-1-1 operator’s 
initial questions were ‘frantic.’”). 
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Court. Even though Hammon was reversed, the formality rationale lives on 
to prevent future defendants from being able to face their accusers in 
court.195 
VI. “STATE-OF-MIND OF THE SPEAKER” RATIONALE CASES ARE 
WRONGLY DECIDED UNDER CRAWFORD 
Another rationale post-Crawford cases employed to deny confrontation 
rights is the state-of-mind test.  These cases examined the state-of-mind of 
the person making the statement at the time it was uttered limiting 
“testimonial” statements to those statements where the speakers intended to 
bear witness.  To be deemed “testimonial” and for the Confrontation Clause 
to apply, the speaker had to have contemplated that his words will be used 
in a future trial. 196 
This state-of-mind test for deciding post-Crawford domestic violence 
cases is particularly widespread in appeals regarding the admission of 911 
calls.197  In Washington v. Davis,198 the case affirmed by the Supreme 
Court, the caller hung up and the 911 operator called back and asked the 
witness a series of questions starting with the last name and then the first 
name of the person who had assaulted the caller.199  On appeal, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that the telephone calls must be 
“scrutinized to determine whether it is a call for help to be rescued from 
peril or is generated by a desire to bear witness.”200  While some of the later 
questions and answers were “testimonial,” the Washington high court held 
that it was proper to admit the most important aspect of the call in Davis, 
the identification of the defendant as being in her home, thereby 
establishing a violation of a restraining order against him. 
 
195. This point will be developed in Section VII.A infra. 
196. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461, 469 (2004). 
197. See, e.g., New York v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. 2004). 
A 911 call was typically initiated by the victim of a crime.  It was generated not by the 
desire of the prosecution or the police to seek evidence against a particular suspect; 
rather, the 911 call had its genesis in the urgent desire of a citizen to be rescued from 
immediate peril. 
Id.; Moscat has been followed by many other jurisdictions: State v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 
590 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (including long list of cases that allow 911 calls); United States v. 
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 362 (3rd Cir. 2005). “[S]tatements made during the 911 call neither fall 
within nor are analogous to any of the specific examples of testimonial statements mentioned in 
Crawford. Emergency calls are nontestimonial absent ‘exceptional circumstances’ where there is 
‘specific information bearing upon the caller’s motive to bear testimony.” Id. at 361-62, n.4. 
198. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), aff’d by Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 
2266 (2006). 
199. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 5. 
200. Davis, 111 P.3d at 849. Cf. Washington v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2004) (stating that a 911 call is “testimonial”). 
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Even though an emergency 911 call may assist police in 
investigation or assist the State in prosecution, where the call is 
not undertaken for those purposes, it does not resemble the 
specific type of out-of-court statement with which the Sixth 
Amendment is concerned.201 
Brushing aside the argument that the caller “reasonably knew her 911 call 
would later be used to prosecute Davis,” the Davis court puts the burden on 
the defense to prove actual intent, concluding that “there is no evidence that 
McCottry [the caller] had such knowledge or that it influenced her deci-
sion.”202  Hence, even though the assault in Davis was completed and the 
caller specifically declined an ambulance or other aid, the high Court 
defined the out-of-court statement as a call for help, falling outside the pur-
view of the Confrontation Clause.203  This “state-of-mind of the witness” 
test threatened to exclude all excited utterances from Sixth Amendment 
protection because excited utterances are by definition made without 
opportunity for the speaker to reflect.204  As one early California opinion 
stated: “Moreover, it is difficult to identify any circumstances under which 
a . . . spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial’ . . . . [S]tatements made 
without reflection or deliberation are not made in contemplation of their 
 
201. Davis, 111 P.3d at 849 (emphasis added). 
202. Id. at 850. 
203. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) 
(No. 05-5224) (giving the facts of declining an aid car and that defendant had just left). Many 
courts have concluded that a hearsay statement made in a 911 call is not “testimonial,” because the 
statement is not made in response to police questioning, and because the purpose of the call is to 
obtain assistance, not to make a record against someone.  See Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 587-90; 
State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. App. 2004); Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776.  But 
see Lopez v. State, 888 So.2d 693, 699 (Fla. 2004) (“A statement is more likely to have been 
made with the expectation that it would be used as evidence if it was given in response to 
questioning by a government official than it would if it had been volunteered.”).  The reasoning in 
Lopez shows how many assumptions lower courts are making about how men and women’s 
thought processes.  Courts could easily have concluded the reverse, namely that someone who 
dials the police must intend for the police to become involved while someone questioned by the 
police at the scene of a crime might simply be trying to deflect police interest in them. 
204. Some early cases interpreted Crawford as excluding all excited utterances from the term 
“testimonial.”  E.g., State v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. 2004). 
The 911 call—usually, a hurried and panicked conversation between an injured victim 
and a police telephone operator—is simply not equivalent to a formal pretrial 
examination by a justice of the peace in Reformation England.  If anything, it is the 
electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry for help.  The Confrontation Clause 
was not directed at such a cry. 
Id.  See also Ohio v. Cananday, 2005 WL 736583 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding Crawford did 
not apply to excited utterances, but rather only applies to hearsay statements that are not subject to 
common-law exceptions). 
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‘testimonial’ use in a future trial.”205  The state-of-mind theory is also not 
exclusively used in 911 cases.206 
Hammon flirted with the idea of ruling that all excited utterances are 
nontestimonial as a matter of law: 
We further note that the very concept of an “excited utterance” is 
such that it is difficult to perceive how such a statement could ever 
be “testimonial.”  The underlying rationale of the excited utterance 
exception is that such a declaration from one who has recently 
suffered an overpowering experience is likely to be truthful.207 
One problem with the state-of-mind test is that it has been built upon the 
excited utterance, which is a legal fiction that requires judges to make 
findings that nobody takes literally.  The speaker does not have the capacity 
to formulate a lie because the shock “stills the reflective faculties and 
removes their control.” 208 
Consider how similar the state-of-mind test is to the excited utterance 
test.  Under the excited utterance exception, trial judges were determining 
that speakers were making statements while under the shock of the event; 
now judges also have to also ask if the speakers who were overcome by 
traumatic events are likely to have known at the time they spoke to police 
that their words will be used against the person they have accused.  Judges 
have already answered the second question when they decided the state-
ments constituted an excited utterance.209  “Their demonstrated emotional 
distress—the very quality that justified the admission of their statements as 
excited utterances—is inconsistent with a determination that they were 
made with a belief that such statements ‘would be available for use later at 
 
205. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 469.  “Mrs. Corella’s statements were ultimately used in a 
criminal prosecution, but statements made without reflection or deliberation are not made in 
contemplation of their ‘testimonial’ use in a future trial.”  Id.   
206. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (placing less emphasis 
on state-of-mind than formality); State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750, 775 (Conn. 2005) (regarding a 
non-domestic shooting, the Connecticut court concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances of the 
present matter, we conclude that an objective witness reasonably would not believe that the 
statements would be available for use at a later trial”). 
207. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 952 (citing Hardiman v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 
2000)). 
208. 6 JAMES H. CHADBURN, EVIDENCE ON TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747 (Chadburn 
rev. 1976). 
209. See State v. Byrd, 828 N.E.2d 133, 136-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
All of the foundational requirements for admission of this 911 call as an excited 
utterance were satisfied in the present case: the existence of a startling or shocking 
event, the declarant’s possessing firsthand knowledge of that event and being under 
the stress or excitement caused by the event when her statement was made, and the 
declarant’s statement that relates to that startling event.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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trial.’”210  Both the objective and subjective state-of-mind standard invites 
the government to build upon the excited utterance myth.  A reasonable 
woman still under the influence of the overpowering event will not be 
found to have been motivated by a desire to prosecute.  If the first step is 
wrong as a matter of science, psychology and logic, then why should the 
court build on it by creating a state-of-mind exception?  Nor should readers 
console themselves with the fact that most courts apply a case-by-case test 
instead of a per se rule towards excited utterances. 
Most courts, including the jurisdictions that decided Hammon and 
Davis, rejected the conclusion that all excited utterances are by definition 
nontestimonial in favor of a case-by-case approach to determine from the 
circumstances of the statements to authorities whether the speaker of the 
excited utterance would reasonably have contemplated the use of the state-
ment to prosecute the defendant at the time it was made.211  The case-by-
case approach still resulted in the exclusion of most, if not all excited 
utterance statements from the clause.212  Judges that admit the statements as 
excited utterances have already determined that the statement was “made 
while still under the stress of excitement from the startling event” and 
“made without time for reflection or deliberation.”213  As the early 
California case of People v. Corella reasoned, “statements made without 
reflection or deliberation are not made in contemplation of their ‘testi-
monial’ use in a future trial.”214  The state-of-mind fiction will be applied 
 
210. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d by 701 
N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005) (discussing an officer who responds to a 911 call and interviews 
two female victims for half an hour, which the court held was not “testimonial”).  
211. Id.  Interestingly, public defenders O’Toole and Easterly observe that in “all but one of 
the 8 cases in which the Court GVR’d [granted certiorari, vacated judgment and remanded for 
further proceedings when the Court decided Davis] the lower courts had improperly relied upon to 
some extent, the ‘excited’ emotional state of the witness when making the statement in order to 
find that the right was not triggered.”  See Timothy O’Toole & Catharine Easterly, Davis v. 
Washington: Confrontation Wins the Day, THE CHAMPION  20, 34 (Mar. 2007). 
212. Salt Lake City v. Williams, 128 P.3d 47 (Utah 2005) (“Other courts have concluded that 
the inquiry into whether statements made during a 911 call are ‘testimonial must be made on a 
case-by-case basis.”); United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2005) (illustrating a non-
domestic violence case where a 911 call was nontestimonial because “the circumstances that made 
the anonymous 911 call an excited utterance were significant enough to overwhelm the caller’s 
capacity to appreciate the potential long-range use of her words”); New York v. Moscat, 777 
N.Y.S.2d 875, 878-80 (N.Y. 2004); Campos v. Texas, 186 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Tex. 2005). 
213. E.g., State v. Mann, 2005 WL 2714531, at *1 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The ‘excited 
utterance’ exception to the hearsay rule is based upon the theory that the declarant’s statements 
must be true because the declarant, caught up in a startling event, lacks ‘the capacity of reflection, 
thereby producing utterances free of conscious fabrication.’”).  Later, when the court considers the 
Confrontation Clause, the court reasons, “[d]uring the initial portion of the 911 tape, Ashley was 
screaming and crying.  Her statements are readily distinguishable from those at issue in 
Crawford.” Id. at *4. 
214. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App 4th 461, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also State v. 
Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005) (approving the Corella decision). 
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by the same judges that have first determined that statements were made 
before the senses have stilled, despite the fact that science fails to support 
their conclusions. It is hardly the principled rule envisioned by Crawford 
when it rejected Roberts in favor of a test more in keeping with the 
Framers’ intent. 
A. THE TEST DERIVES FROM A MISREADING OF CRAWFORD’S THIRD 
POSSIBLE CORE DEFINITION 
Ironically, the theory that the state-of-mind of the speaker should guide 
a court in determining whether a statement is “testimonial” was a broad 
theory of confrontation now being employed by the courts as a rationale to 
narrow the Confrontation Clause below what Crawford defines as a 
minimum.  The state-of-mind formulation was intended to expand the 
statements at issue beyond those given to police officers, not to exclude 
statements to police officers from Sixth Amendment coverage.215  The 
state-of-mind of the speaker should not matter in a situation such as Davis 
or Hammon when statements were made in response to police questions, 
just as the state-of-mind of Ms. Crawford was immaterial to the determi-
nation of whether the clause applied to her incriminating statements.216 
The state-of-mind of the speaker analysis was introduced by the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) in their 
Supreme Court amicus brief to encourage the Court to expand “testimonial” 
statements beyond those given to police officers.217  The brief was then 
quoted in Crawford where Justice Scalia wrote that at least three 
formulations of core classes of “testimonial” exist, including “statements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
 
215. See Brief for The Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner 25, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2003) (No. 02-9410) (discussed 
in following paragraph) [hereinafter NACDL Brief, Crawford] (“And calls to 911 call for some 
judgment in the application of the testimonial approach.  That is because 911 serves a dual role in 
our society.  It is both a component of our law enforcement system (suggesting that statement to 
911 are testimonial) and an emergency response system (suggesting that statement to 911 are not 
testimonial); see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 82, at 1240-41 (“If a statement is made 
in circumstances in which a reasonable person would realize that it likely would be used in 
investigation or prosecution of a crime, then the statement would be deemed testimonial.”).  The 
authors show how this applies to exclude many 911 calls.  Id. at 1242-43. 
216. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53; see Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2271 (2006) 
(involving a 911 operator who asked multiple questions); Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 
2005) (involving a police officer who asked “what happened?”). 
217.  NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 215, at 3. 
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reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”218 
Many courts, such as the Washington appeals court in Washington v. 
Davis, employed a subjective rather than an objective state-of-mind test.219  
That formulation is at odds with the “objective witness” language in 
Crawford set forth in the above quotation.  A subjective approach creates a 
notably difficult burden where the witness in question is not in court to 
testify to his or her state-of-mind, which is per force the situation in all 
these cases.  One wonders how defense counsel might be expected to prove 
what a missing witness actually knew or intended and what the witness’ 
motivations were at the time the statement was made.220 
Some courts have read the state-of-mind exception to mean that it is 
not enough that the speaker made statements to police knowing that they 
might cause the arrest of the alleged perpetrator; she or he must also believe 
that the statements will be used at trial.221  However, turning to the source, 
the NACDL brief uses the phrase “available for use at a later trial” 
synonymously with these other phrases: “will lead the State to punish the 
accused person,” “condemn the accused as a criminal and restrain his or her 
liberty” and the statement was “aimed at law enforcement.”222  A more 
common sense question, and one in keeping with its genesis in the NACDL 
brief, is whether it is reasonable to expect that the information will be used 
against the accused in some way by law enforcement.  Here is a quote from 
the NACDL brief: 
By and large statements made to law enforcement officials about a 
crime will be “testimonial.”  And by and large, statements made to 
friends, relatives, accomplices or any outside of criminal justice 
system will not be “testimonial.”  There will be exceptions to these 
broad and general rules, of course.  A witness to a crime may make 
a statement to a friend knowing that the friend will subsequently 
 
218. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  The NACDL brief itself uses various formulations of the 
notation that statements will be used to help prosecute including the form Justice Scalia inserts 
into the majority opinion.  See NACDL brief, supra note 215, at 24-25. 
219. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849-50 (Wash. 2005); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 
N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005). 
220. Friedman, Grappling, supra note 181, at 253.  Friedman has argued strenuously that the 
test should be objective, not subjective.  Id. 
221. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004) 
(“No reasonable person in John’s shoes would have expected his statements to Dr. Russell to be 
used prosecutorially, at defendant’s trial.  This is true even if he thought the doctor might relay his 
statements to the police.”). 
222. NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 215, at 24-25. 
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contact police.  Such a statement is aimed at law enforcement and 
would therefore be “testimonial.”223 
As we see, NACDL did not intend to restrict the Confrontation Clause 
where statements were made to government officials. NACDL’s state-of-
mind theory broadens the reach of the Sixth Amendment beyond statements 
to law enforcement personnel to certain private conversations aimed at law 
enforcement. 
In adopting the NACDL proposal as one of its three possible 
definitions of “testimonial,” the Crawford majority was expanding the 
application of the clause, not narrowing it.  Crawford could not possibly 
have intended such a restrictive reading of “testimonial.”  A narrow reading 
would conflict with footnote eight where Crawford questioned the admis-
sion of the excited utterance in White v. Illinois without confrontation even 
though the statement was made by a four-year old child.224  The Supreme 
Court could not have meant that a reasonable four-year-old would have 
known her statement would be used in lieu of testimony at trial.  The 
ambiguity Crawford offered to allow an expansion of the clause beyond 
statements to police officers has been fashioned into an argument to restrict 
the clause so that most excited utterances made to police officers are not 
covered by the Sixth Amendment.  In this way, we see how the lower courts 
exploited the ambiguity in Crawford to narrow its holding and to reach 
certain results.  The next section will show how a restricted reading would 
even conflict with the holding that Sylvia Crawford’s confession was 
testimonial. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT NEVER ADDRESSED WHAT SYLVIA 
CRAWFORD WAS THINKING 
The state-of-mind test as a limit to the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause does not square with the Crawford opinion because the Supreme 
Court never applied the state-of-mind test to Ms. Crawford’s statement to 
police.  The Crawford decision labeled Sylvia Crawford’s statements 
“testimonial” because they were in response to police interrogation; the 
Court did not write that in speaking to the police, the defendant’s wife was 
motivated by a desire to prosecute her husband nor that she knew or should 
have known that her statement would come in against him at trial.  Neither 
does Crawford order the trial court to make these factual determinations on 
 
223. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
224. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.  Davis also reiterates that White v. Illinois is the “one 
arguable exception” where testimonial statements may have been allowed into evidence under the 
old framework.  Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2275.  
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remand.225  The state-of-mind test was therefore never intended as a 
limitation upon statements that were otherwise “testimonial.” 
Had the Court decided the application of the clause in Crawford based 
on his wife’s state-of-mind at the time she made the statement, the Court 
might have come out with the opposite result.  In Crawford, the police 
arrested Mr. Crawford and brought his wife, Sylvia Crawford to the police 
station where they gave her Miranda warnings and interviewed her twice.226  
During these stationhouse interviews she gave statements to police that 
helped prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense.  When she made 
those statements, Sylvia Crawford may not have been motivated by a desire 
to give testimony against her husband nor would she reasonably know that 
her statement would be used at trial against him.  Rather, one might expect 
that the declarant in Crawford was motivated by a desire to help herself, to 
go home or to be let alone.  After all, she was in custody and had been 
cautioned that whatever she said could be used against her, but no one told 
her that her statement could be used against the defendant.227  If she did not 
intend the statements to be used in court, then under the theory used by 
several courts after Crawford, they would be able to be used.  Notice the 
paradoxical reasoning of this state-of-mind rationale that courts use.  If 
interlocking confessions were used in court regularly, it would soon become 
common knowledge that they could be so used.  Once a reasonable witness 
knows that his statement to police can be used to prosecute a co-
conspirator, then the interlocking confession constitutes a testimonial 
statement and cannot be used. 
 
225. Crawford was remanded to the trial court to determine what the trial court should do 
given that Sylvia Crawford’s statements were improperly admitted in violation of the Confron-
tation Clause.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.  The issue of harmless error was a possible avenue for 
the lower courts, not a decision that the statement was in fact nontestimonial because Ms. 
Crawford’s primary motivation in making the statement was not to help prosecute her husband.  
Id. at 42 n.1. 
226. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
227. In fact, even if she had been a lawyer and digested the Supreme Court’s prior opinions 
on that issue, she might have thought it unlikely that her statement could be used against her 
husband.  See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (noting that it was “highly unlikely” that 
accomplice confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts); Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968) (stating that separate trials of defendants are required so that the 
confession of one conspirator may not be heard by a jury considering the guilt of a co-
conspirator).  A lay person, such as Sylvia Crawford, could hardly be expected to know that the 
long-established Bruton rule was being replaced in some jurisdictions by a new “interlocking 
confessions” rule that Crawford itself roundly rejected as a misinterpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (discussing the misreading of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 
(1986)). Crawford also cites Bruton with approval. Id. at 57.  Also note that in Crawford, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurred, reasoning that Sylvia’s statement was 
inadmissible under the old Robert line of cases.  Id. at 71 (Rehnquist & O’Connor, C.J.J., 
concurring). 
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Much has been made about the distinction between the subjective state-
of-mind approach and the reasonable person test, but Ms. Crawford’s 
statement loses under either test.  We have just determined that Mr. 
Crawford would not prevail if the Supreme Court had imposed an objective 
state-of-mind approach upon Sylvia Crawford’s statements.  The subjective 
Confrontation Clause violation is even harder to prove than the reasonable 
person approach since Ms. Crawford was not available to answer questions, 
a problem courts would always encounter when dealing with statements 
made by witnesses who do not appear at trial or who claim a privilege.228  
Under the individual or subjective state-of-mind approach established by 
Washington in Davis, a judge must determine what the missing witness 
actually thought about her statement being used as testimony at trial at the 
time she made the statement rather than what a reasonable person in her 
position would have thought.  Had Crawford applied the Washington 
Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Court would likely have concluded that 
“there is no evidence” that the declarant, Sylvia Crawford, knew at the time 
she made the statement that her words would later be used to prosecute her 
husband “or that it influenced her decision” to talk to the police.229  Thus, 
the decision in Davis and other lower court applications of the state-of-mind 
approach are manifestly erroneous for the approach contradicts the holding 
in Crawford.  Hence, had the Supreme Court employed the state-of-mind 
approach as a method of limiting which statements to police are “testi-
monial,” Mr. Crawford might have lost.  More importantly, that analysis 
was never undertaken, proving that the state-of-mind test was not intended 
to limit the scope of which police interrogations are testimonial. 
C. DOES THE STATE-OF-MIND TEST SURVIVE THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DAVIS DECISION? 
This section has demonstrated that the “state-of-mind” test, which was 
developed by lower courts to circumvent confrontation, was derived from a 
misinterpretation of Crawford’s dicta about possible core definitions of 
testimonial.  It has also shown how this rationale threatened to undo most 
confrontation rights because judges may often conclude as a finding of fact 
that a particular declarant—or reasonable declarants in their position—did 
make the statement intending it to be introduced at trial. 
The Davis decision is confusing because it both rejects the state-of- 
mind test and embraces it.  One must distinguish the state-of-mind of the 
 
228. Sylvia Crawford claimed the marital privilege and was therefore deemed unavailable at 
trial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
229. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005). 
       
2007] CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION 437 
person making a statement from the intent of the officers in taking the 
statement.  While the state court decision in Davis was based on the state-
of-mind of the declarant, the Supreme Court decision was based on the 
intent of the officers, to wit, the primary purpose of the officers in asking 
questions.  Nevertheless, it would be premature to decide that the state-of-
mind rationale is dead.  Although the Court never uses the term “state-of-
mind of the declarant” in its decision, the reasoning section discusses the 
state-of-mind of the witness as if that were critical to its conclusion.  In its 
Davis opinion, the Supreme Court opined that the alleged victim who 
phoned 911 did so “to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”230  
Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned, the statements were not testimony 
because “no ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek 
help.”  This is quintessential state-of-mind of the declarant reasoning.  
Unlike Crawford where the Court proposed a state-of-mind test to expand 
the concept of testimonial to statements to non-government officials, here, 
the Davis Court invoked the state-of-mind of the caller as a rationale that 
limits—not expands—the scope of what is testimonial. 
In its reasoning, the Davis Court assumed that the caller was 
undergoing an emergency because the caller told the police she was in an 
emergency.  The Court assumed that the assailant was still in her home 
because that is what she told the police.  Her accusation was deemed to be 
true without the benefit of cross-examination or oath and without her 
repeating the allegation before a judge.  The lack of confrontation rights 
rests on the dubious assumption that people who call 911 never lie about 
whether there is an ongoing emergency.  In other words, if a 911 caller does 
not indicate he is calling 911 to seek immediate help, then the truth of his 
accusation may be tested at trial through live testimony under oath subject 
to cross-examination, but if calls and claims to be in danger at the time of 
the call, then courts should assume this is true and his accusation need not 
be tested through confrontation. 
One cannot discuss the veracity of 911 callers without remembering the 
Charles Stuart case.  On national television, Americans heard one of the 
most moving emergency calls where a white man, bleeding from the 
abdomen, used his cell phone to tell the police that he and his pregnant wife 
were shot by a black assailant who entered their car, killing his pregnant 
wife in Boston in 1989.  Later, it turned out that what he told the police in 
the 911 call was false, fortunately for a particular black man who was well 
 
230. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). 
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on his way to paying for this horrific crime.231  Stuart’s desperate call for 
help should have reminded the Court that the Confrontation Clause was 
adopted because alleged victims sometimes shade the facts or fabricate 
whole lies and that the emergency response system is not protected from 
misuse.  Davis can be harnessed by future trial courts that wish to use the 
state-of-mind of the declarant as a reason to deny the application of the 
Confrontation Clause in future cases.  Just as Crawford’s ambiguity was 
used to limit confrontation rights, so will Davis’ ambiguity provide ammu-
nition for limiting rights in future cases. 
Again, we see the Supreme Court in Davis borrowing a rationale from 
lower court decisions that was used to restrict the reach of the Confron-
tation Clause.  Crawford introduced the state-of-mind exception as a ration-
ale to expand the reach of the clause not to restrict it.  When Davis uses the 
state-of-mind exception to restrict the scope of the clause so that statements 
to police officers are not covered, then it is not following Crawford.  In fact, 
such a limited state-of-mind test contradicts Crawford’s holding as well as 
its reasoning.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s broad vision seems to be shrink-
ing with the help of the resistance from domestic violence decisions from 
lower courts. 
VII. “INTENT OF THE OFFICERS” RATIONALE CASES ARE 
WRONGLY DECIDED UNDER CRAWFORD 
The primary holding in Washington v. Davis is that what is testimonial 
turns upon the intent of the police officers and agents of the police in taking 
the statements.  Before Davis, many state courts used the formality rationale 
and many courts used the state-of-mind of the declarant rationale to permit 
witnessless prosecutions in domestic violence cases, but a few other courts 
looked at the reasons the officer took the out-of-court statement.232  This 
 
231. This is the case of alleged victim Charles Stuart, whose brother Michael Stuart, 
ultimately revealed that there was no black assailant. Sean P. Murphy, Stuart Murders Bedevil 
Bennett, Still in Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1990, at A1.  Michael revealed that Charles 
Stuart killed his own wife and Michael helped by wounding his brother Charles to make the 
unknown assailant accusation more believable.  Id. The police were closing in on a particular 
black male suspect, Willie Bennett, and they brought Charles Stewart to a line-up, where 
coincidentally or with the help of the police, Bennett was picked out.  Id. 
232. See Appendix (illustrating cases that adopt the intent-of-the-officers’ rationale). 
D.C.: Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. 2005); see United States v. 
Webb, 2005 WL 2726100, at *4 (D.C. Super. 2005) (stating that officer’s testimony as 
to the victim’s statements at the scene of the incident was nontestimonial).  In Webb, 
the officer’s main concerns were to investigate and to ascertain what was happening 
and the victim offered the information without considering whether it could be used 
later at trial.  Id. 
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intent-of-the-officers approach rejects the broad proposition of some 
jurisdictions that only formal police station interrogations are covered by 
the Confrontation Clause or that all excited utterances are nontestimonial.233  
Instead, these cases carve out a middle ground where the statements to law 
enforcement are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if law 
enforcement gathered statements as part of an investigation of a crime and 
are therefore “testimonial,” or were made during an initial phase of a re-
sponse call when police were responding to emergency or medical issues 
rather than investigating a crime.234  Because of its case-by-case approach, 
this rationale may seem more in keeping with Crawford’s promise of more 
confrontation rights but in fact, few courts interpreted Crawford to mean 
that excited utterances are nontestimonial by definition.  Most courts 
adopted a case-by-case approach—at least in theory—regardless of whether 
their analysis fell under the formality, state-of-mind or intent-of-the-offi-
cers’ rationale or some combination of the three.235  The first jurisdiction to 
adopt the intent-of-the-officers approach, looking at the particular circum-
stances in which the statement was made, was the District of Columbia in 
Stancil.236  Stancil focused on the intent of those taking the statement rather 
 
MASSACHUSETTS: Commonweath v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Mass. 
2005) (providing that statements are testimonial because on the record “[t]he ques-
tioning does not appear intended or necessary to secure a volatile scene”). 
MINNESOTA: State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 2005). Trial judge held 
that where officer encountered victim in the street, initial statement accusing boyfriend 
was admissible but judge excluded further comments by the victim as she “went into 
great detail about defendant striking her with a cooking pot, and his chasing her with a 
knife while threatening to kill her.”  Id. at 307, 311.  The court of appeals overruled 
the exclusion of later statements, holding that judge clearly erred when he concluded 
they were not excited utterances.  Id. at 311.  
TEXAS: Key v. Texas, 173 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (indicating that the 
officer was not producing evidence in anticipation of a criminal prosecution when he 
encountered the victim, but was instead responding to a call and trying to assess the 
scene).  
233. See, e.g., State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 991 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (adopting a “per se 
rule that excited utterances cannot be testimonial”). 
234. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) (rejecting the notion that all excited 
utterances are nontestimonial by definition); see also Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 
549 (Mass. 2005) (leaving one important question unanswered: whether courts are creating an 
intent-of-the-officers exception to the confrontation clause or actually instituting a necessity 
rational akin to search and seizure exceptions); People v. Kilday, 123 Cal. App. 4th 406, 421 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2004) (describing officers responding to a call from a hotel manager and encountering a 
victim in lobby when area was unsecured and the situation uncertain). 
235. The overwhelming majority of courts do not use a categorical approach to determining 
the admissibility of these statements; rather, they determine whether the statements are admissible 
by examining, on a case-by-case basis.  E.g., Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2005).  Note that both domestic violence trials reviewed by the Supreme Court were decided in 
favor of the government on the case by case basis, and they were litigated before police and 
prosecutors had time to frame the issue in terms of the new post-Crawford requirements. 
236. Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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than the state-of-mind of the person making the statement.  Stancil held that 
statements made to the police when they are trying to calm the situation are 
nontestimonial while statements made once the police have focused on a 
suspect and are in the investigation state are “testimonial.”  Stancil divided 
the police response into two stages.  In Stage I, police secure the scene, 
separating the parties and calming people down; in Stage II, police question 
the participants. Massachusetts also took this approach in Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves.237  “We hold that statements made in response to questioning by 
law enforcement agents are per se ‘testimonial,’ except when the ques-
tioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or 
provide medical care.”238 
The underlying facts in Stancil are exceptional in that these two stages 
may truly have occurred.  After all, the trial took place before Crawford, 
before police had an opportunity to shade their testimony to conform to the 
new jurisprudence.  At the initial hearing in Stancil, the police officer 
testified that when she got to the scene she saw a child with a knife who 
was screaming.239  Note that these screams constitute the historic type of 
excited utterance and that no one questioned the admissibility of these 
statements from the child at trial or on appeal.  At issue were later state-
ments made by the girl’s mother (the alleged victim) that were admitted 
into trial without benefit of cross-examination. 
At the initial hearing before the trial court in Stancil, the police officer 
testified that she calmed everyone down and separated them before ob-
taining statements.  Stancil held that statements made after everyone was 
calmed down and separated would be subject to Sixth Amendment require-
ments.  Hence, one would expect that the appellate court would disallow the 
mother’s statements, the accusatory statements made in Stage II when 
everyone calmed down, which would reverse the conviction because these 
constituted the primary evidence at trial against Mr. Stancil.  Nevertheless, 
the appeals court did not reverse the conviction, but remanded the case, 
noting a contradiction in the testimony and allowing the trial court to 
determine on remand whether or not the challenged statements actually 
occurred after everyone calmed down or whether the questioning occurred 
instead as part of Stage I and therefore the statements were not subject to 
 
237. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).  Unless police were in-
volved in community caretaking or stabilizing a volatile situation, statements made to them in the 
course of their investigation were “testimonial” per se and subject to exclusion in the absence of 
an opportunity to cross-examine.  They were not “testimonial” per se, but the trial court after 
remand would have to determine whether they were in fact made with a view toward future 
prosecution.  Id. 
238. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d  at 552. 
239. Stancil, 866 A.2d at 802. 
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Sixth Amendment constraints.240  The appeals court found it difficult to 
reconcile the officer’s testimony that the victim only talked to police “after 
we got all the parties involved separated and calmed down” with testimony 
elsewhere that when the officer spoke to the victim, the victim “was “shak-
ing and crying.”  The logical explanation for the disparity in testimony is 
that when the officer spoke of shaking and crying, the officer was giving 
the necessary incantation to convince the judge to admit the statement as an 
excited utterance.  But, that possibility was not addressed.  The appeals 
court’s reaction to the record before it illustrates the artificiality of this two-
stage analysis where courts can classify Stage II questioning as Stage I 
questioning.  Even this clear testimony that the parties were separated and 
questioned was deemed subject to interpretation by a court finding a way 
not to reverse a conviction. 
Stancil points to how easily police may shape their testimony to make 
the hearsay admissible.  In remanding the case, the District of Columbia 
court gave the officers a chance to explain that the alleged victim was not 
yet calm and therefore that the questions and answers should constitute 
Stage I statements.  Under the new rule announced in Stancil, all the police 
officers have to do to convince District of Columbia trial judges to allow a 
statement in as nontestimonial is add a new incantation that “while the com-
plainant was shaking and crying I asked her some questions.”  The District 
of Columbia court thereby created a loophole large enough to ferry most 
excited utterances through. 
The intent-of-the-officers cases were wrongly decided under Crawford.  
The intent-of-the-officers rationale is a means of narrowing the holding in 
Crawford that “at a minimum” defendants must not be tried by absent wit-
nesses who gave their out-of-court testimony against the defendant to police 
during interrogation.  In trying to narrow the definition of interrogation, 
these cases abrogate the third possible core definition of testimony set forth 
in Crawford, namely statements made by witnesses knowing they will be 
used to help prosecute.241  Thus, a person may call the police planning to 
start a prosecution (core testimonial), but these courts will find the state-
ments to be deemed nontestimonial because the police asked questions 
 
240. Id. at 815 (remanding the case to the trial judge to determine what statements were 
made within Stage I, and were therefore properly admitted in addition to what statements were 
made within Stage II, and should have been excluded). 
241. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (evidencing one possible core 
definition of testimonial as “[s]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial”). 
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intending to help that person (intent-of-the-officers).242  Given that 
Crawford announced that the Confrontation Clause applied “at a minimum” 
to police interrogation, lower courts are not applying Crawford’s reasoning 
when they seek to limit the application of the clause by carving an 
exception to the rule, an exception that threatens to swallow the rule itself, 
at least for trials in domestic violence cases. 
In addition, the determination of whether accusations were made 
during an emergency or calm situation hardly seems a proper distinction for 
whether to apply our “common-law tradition . . . of live testimony in court 
subject to adversarial testing.”243  For example, Stancil’s accuser may have 
been telling the complete truth to the police or may have been lying, or her 
allegations may rest somewhere in-between.  Traditionally, whether the 
witness is telling the truth would be determined by the factfinder who 
listens to the witness testify under oath.  Traditionally, a defense lawyer 
will cross-examine the witness in front of the jury to flesh out possible 
motives for her to dissemble and to help jurors determine her credibility.  
After Stancil, the jury will only have an opportunity to determine the 
witness’ credibility if a trial judge decides that her statements were made 
during Stage II of the police response.  Of course Stage I and Stage II have 
nothing to do with whether the witness was lying or whether confrontation 
rights lead to better assessments of credibility.  The intent of the police in 
asking questions has really nothing to do with the underlying purpose of 
requiring witnesses to appear in court and repeat or recant their initial 
accusations.244 
One problem with the intent-of-the-officers test is that it tends to 
confuse the officer’s intent with the state-of-mind of the declarant, and does 
so in such a way that it bypasses the original state-of-mind principle 
articulated in Crawford that those that know they are implicating someone 
 
242. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006) (giving up lip service to a 
Confrontation Clause that extends beyond police interrogation). 
This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation 
are necessarily nontestimonial.  The Framers were no more willing to exempt from 
cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than 
they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.  (Part of the evidence against 
Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of 
sustained questioning. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 27 (1603).)  And of course 
even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not 
the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate. 
Id.  This quote is absolutely true as a principle of Sixth Amendment history but it is at odds with 
the rest of the Court’s opinion because the Court never considered any other theory whereby Ms. 
Davis’ incriminating statements were evaluated aside from the question of interrogation. 
243. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND  373-74 (1768)). 
244. See Ross, supra note 4, at 162 (providing a larger discussion of this issue). 
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to authorities are giving testimony.245  Another fault with the intent-of-the-
officer cases is that the category does not comport with reality because 
emergency systems are set up to help arrest and prosecute as well as to help 
callers and police have a dual role when they respond to a scene of a 
possible crime.246  As a result, the rationale invites courts to create fictions 
of the term witness and testimony.247  Moreover, the rationale encourages 
police to change their investigative techniques so that more information is 
gathered at the emergency stages of investigation.  For example, instead of 
asking Mrs. Hammon to sit down before asking her what happened, police 
will have this conversation on the front step.248  This alteration will help 
avoid confrontation rights, the opposite goal of that expressed in 
Crawford.249  The lower courts addressed in this section also failed to 
implement the Supreme Court’s policy as they applied Crawford to differ-
ent fact patterns.  Instead, these courts sought ways to narrow Crawford’s 
holding by picking out the word interrogation and ignoring the policy set 
forth in the opinion of increasing confrontation beyond Crawford’s 
particular factual situation of a station house interview. 
A. DAVIS INVITES LOWER COURTS TO CONTINUE TO INTRODUCE OUT 
OF COURT ACCUSATIONS IN PLACE OF LIVE TESTIMONY 
When the Supreme Court adopted the intent-of-the-officers test in 
Davis v. Washington, one could say the Court followed Stancil and 
Gonzales.  Crawford never focused on the intent of the officers, either 
generally or in regards to the specific facts of the case.  The intent-of-the-
 
245. Why should it matter in Stancil whether the witness was upset or calm when she spoke?  
The theory seems to be that if the witness sounds upset, the officer’s intent would be different than 
if the witness is not upset.  Still, whether the witness was upset sounds like it goes to the state-of-
mind of the declarant.  Moreover, even if the declarant was upset, under the original Crawford 
state-of-mind test, the statements would still be testimonial as long as the witness realized that he 
or she was giving information that would likely lead to arrest or prosecution of the person he or 
she accused. 
246. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280, 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (providing one of Justice Thomas’ observations in Davis). 
247. See Ross, supra note 4, at 174-76, 216-17. 
248. See, e.g., Ohio v. Colon, 2007 WL 179082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (involving a police 
officer who elicited information about what had happened while a victim was sitting on a curb 
after the perpetrator had left).  Statements gathered in the manner involved in Colon were deemed 
nontestimonial unlike Hammon where “the police interrogation of the victim and the suspect 
occurred in separate rooms.”  Id.  Note that the arrest in Colon occurred after Crawford was 
decided, so police may have already started to shift their tactics to less formal information-
gathering. 
249. See Mosteller, supra note 32, at 514 (“I suggest that the path of the law’s development 
will be improved if the clause read as a positive command to afford the accused the right ‘to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him’ rather than principally as a negative restriction on the 
admission of certain out-of-court evidence.”). 
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officers test constitutes a limit on Crawford’s declaration that police inter-
rogations are core testimonial statements.  “Whatever else the term covers, 
it applies at a minimum . . . to police interrogations,” the Crawford court 
decreed.250  Now with Davis, this minimum has an exception.  The Supreme 
Court set out in Davis to clarify Crawford but ended up undercutting the 
breadth of the earlier decision, both in tone and in substance.251 
While Davis appeared to adopt the test posed by the small number of 
courts that based admissibility on the intent-of-the officers, the decision 
also referenced the other two tests described above as reasons to determine 
that accusations to police are nontestimonial.  In this way Davis chooses 
ambiguity over bright line determinations, such as the bright line rule that 
all statements made to police are testimonial.  The Davis test allows many 
different circumstances to influence a trial judge’s conclusion.  Because of 
its multiple focus, the intent-of-the-officer approach is unavoidably 
malleable.252  Throughout this article, we have seen how ambiguity and 
malleability end up helping the government introduce evidence without live 
witnesses.  The incentive to allow a trial to proceed or to affirm a convic-
tion are great, while the interest in giving a defendant the opportunity to 
confront her accuser will often take a back seat, particularly if courts pre-
sume that the defendant is guilty and that the absent witness told the truth to 
police.  Thus, while Davis could be read broadly to require confrontation 
except in situations almost factually identical to the Davis facts,253 lower 
courts are ultimately likely to end up interpreting Davis to exclude all 911 
calls from Sixth Amendment protection and many statements taken at the 
scene of the crime.254  Davis’ case-by-case approach is hardly the bright 
 
250. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
251. That may seem counter-intuitive given that in reversing the Hammon decision, the 
Davis Court refused to constrict the Confrontation Clause to statements taken at the police station.  
However, Hammon should have been an easy case for reversal for the Indiana Courts as well as 
for the Supreme Court.  Like the facts in Crawford, the statements implicating Hammon were 
made to a police officer after a crime was committed.  The Hammon case thus fell easily within 
the scope of Crawford’s broad sweeping mandate that accusers give testimony in open court. 
252. See Mosteller, supra note 32, at 568 (describing how police will change their 
procedures in order for evidence to become admissible at trial); see also Ross, supra note 4, at 
205-06 (“The Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial use 
of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that 
provision. . . testimonial statements are what they are.”). 
253. O’Toole & Easterly, supra note 211, at 253 (“Davis thus classifies as testimonial a huge 
category of statements—all post-crime statements to law enforcement officers . . . .”). 
254. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 163 P.3d 1000, 1004 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) 
(parenthetical).  After Supreme Court reversed and remanded Anderson back to Alaska, 126 S. Ct. 
2983,  the Court again affirmed the conviction even though the questioning took place after one 
officer “remained with” the defendant while the other officer went with one accuser back to her 
apartment where the officer questioned the alleged victim.  All these statements were deemed non-
testimonial because “the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the 
       
2007] CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION 445 
line rule that the Crawford opinion declared was needed when it overruled 
the Roberts’ line of cases precisely because the rules were too malleable 
and allowed courts to bend the rules to allow in “testimonial” hearsay.  
How malleable the case-by-case approach is, turns on the definition of 
emergency.  If the emergency exception applies whenever police are trying 
to find out the identity of the person who committed the offense in order to 
know if the police may have to deal with someone who may be a danger to 
them, then the exception is broad.  If it only applies when the police are not 
there to protect the witness, such as when they ask questions over the 
telephone, then that would be much narrower.  When the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Washington court, it concluded that the operator asked the last 
name, first name and middle initial of the defendant in order to let police 
officials “know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.”255  
Davis never stated whether this inquiry was reserved for 911 calls or wheth-
er police at the scene might have questions to learn if they are encountering 
a violent felon in the house or when they leave the house.  After Davis, 
courts do not know whether the emergency response exception includes 
statements made to help arrest the person responsible for the alleged act or 
whether it is narrow, including only those statements where the declarant 
asserts that he is still in danger and the police are not there to protect him.  
After studying the decisions that interpreted the Supreme Court’s first 
ambiguous decision, Crawford v. Washington, readers will now predict that 
lower courts will exploit the ambiguity in the second Supreme Court 
decision to restrict confrontation rights. 
 
interrogation was to enable police to resolve an on-going emergency.”  But see State v. Wright, 
701 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005), vacated and remanded, Wright v. Minnesota, 126 S.Ct. 299 
(2006) (illustrating a case where the Supreme Court accepted certiorari the same year as Davis and 
vacated the judgment and remanded to the Supreme Court of Minnesota for further consideration 
in light of Davis).  On remand, the Court affirmed that two 911 calls were nontestimonial but held 
that the statements at the scene were testimonial under Davis because they were made after the 
defendant was already in custody. Id. at 474, 476.  The Court remanded the case so that lower 
courts could determine whether the client had forfeited his right of confrontation by procuring the 
witnesses’ unavailability. Id. at 482. 
255. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. at 2276.  This is the full third prong differentiating the 
two statements: 
Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, 
was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present 
emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the 
past.  That is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the identity of the assailant, 
so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a 
violent felon. 
Id.; see, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 186 
(2004) (“Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are 
dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible 
danger to the potential victim.”).  
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B. POST-DAVIS DECISIONS 
Indeed, many courts have interpreted Davis broadly. In the 911 
context, Davis relied on the fact that the abuser was in the home at the time 
of the call,256 but lower courts after Davis have decided that 911 calls where 
the alleged abuser is no longer in the same location as the caller are also 
beyond the scope of the Confrontation Clause.257  The lower courts are also 
expanding Davis’ intent-of-the-officers rationale to conclude that state-
ments made at the scene are beyond the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause.258  Many lower courts permit on-cite interviews with police.  Some 
cases hold that the fact that the assailant was not present at the scene means 
that the evidence is nontestimonial.259  Conversely, some cases hold that the 
fact that the assailant was present means that the evidence is 
nontestimonial.260 
 
256. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). “In this case, for example, after the 
operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency 
appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises) . . . .  It could be readily 
maintained that, from that point on, McCottry’s statements were testimonial.”  Id.   
257. In fact, courts have also decided that 911 calls where the alleged abuser was no longer 
in the same location as the caller are beyond the Confrontation Clause’s scope. See, e.g., State v. 
Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 274-75 (Or. 2006) (involving a 911 call where the caller “explained that 
her ‘boyfriend’ hit her but that he since left the house”).  Camerana held that the 911 call was 
nontestimonial because, “although Carder was referring to ‘past’ events, the danger of a renewal 
of the domestic assault had not necessarily or fully abated.  Defendant had just left; he could 
easily have returned before the police could arrive.”  See also Ohio v. Colon, 2007 WL 179082 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (finding that statements were nontestimonial even though police were at the 
scene and defendant had left because “the defendant had just fled the scene and not been secured 
by police.”); People v. Brenn, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (involving an 
accuser who left the home after the alleged crime and called the police from a neighbor’s home 
and told operator he wanted to press charges, which the court held were not testimonial in part 
because the statements were made “in rapid-fire questioning from dispatcher”). 
258. E.g., People v. Bradley. 862 N.E.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. 2006).  Only testimony introduced at 
trial that defendant through the victim through a glass door was police officer repeating statement 
made by the victim at the scene.  The police officer testified he responded to a 911 call and asked 
the victim “what happened” at the door of the apartment.  Id.  Accusation against the defendant 
was nontestimonial because “Asking Dison ‘what happened’ was a normal and appropriate way to 
begin” the task of finding out what had caused the injuries so that he could decide what, if any, 
action was necessary to prevent further harm.”  Id. 
259. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2007) (indicating that 
statements at scene are admissible because “the assailant was still at large” unlike Hammon where 
he was in the home with the police). 
260. E.g., State v. Vinson, 221 S.W. 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2007). In Vinson, the statement at 
scene answering questions nontestimonial because, “[f]irst, [the missing witness] ‘was present 
during the making of all of [the accuser’s] remaining statements.’”  Id.  Other reasons a live 
witness need not be produced included (1) that the witness identified the accuser as her assailant; 
(2) that the police officer testified he did not feel safe until the accused was placed in a police 
cruiser after the interview concluded; (3) “the record simply does not reveal what the deputy’s 
questions were” and (4) the witness was badly injured yet the deputy waited to call medical 
personnel to help the accuser until all the statements were gathered.  Id. at 266-67. 
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One example of a lower court continuing to allow statements taken at 
the scene despite the Court’s ruling in Hammon is State v. Rodriguez,261 
where the alleged victim did not appear at trial and police repeated the con-
tents of extensive conversations with her at the scene.  The alleged victim 
told of the time that her boyfriend, the defendant, had come home the night 
before, what he said to her, and extensive testimony about the horrible types 
of punishment she allegedly endured at his hands.262  Even her statement 
that “the police can’t help me” came in as part of the narrative of what she 
talked about with the officer that night.  The statements were the backbone 
of the prosecution against him for battery and intimidation.263  The 
Wisconsin appeals court began its analysis with the words: “Every 
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to confront his or her accusers.”  The 
decision ends by determining that all the statements were properly admitted 
without a live witness because under Davis, the confrontation guarantee 
does not apply to this accuser because of the way the accusations were 
gathered by police.  The Court starts with the state-of-mind analysis, 
writing that “when police talk to an attack-victim when the stress and 
cognitive disruption caused by the attack is still dominant,” there is no 
confrontation right “because the key consideration . . . focuses on an objec-
tive analysis of the out-of-court declarant’s expectation as to how what he 
or she tells law enforcement will be used.”264  The Court then proceeds to 
the intent-of-the-officers and the formality test: 
It also cannot be said that, objectively, the officers intended to 
record past activities rather than assess the then-current situation.  
Moreover, there is nothing in the Record that indicates that any-
thing either Ms. LaMoore or her daughter told the officers during 
that first encounter was in response to any sort of structured 
interrogation to questioning beyond simple inquiries.  Simply put, 
Officers Sterling and Kurtz did not go to the LaMoore house 
looking for evidence with which to prosecute Rodriguez, and, after 
they arrived their focus was not on building a case against him but, 
rather, trying to ensure the safety of Ms. LaMoore and her 
 
261. 722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) 
262. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d at 140-41. 
263. Id. at 140.  There were plenty of supporting facts such as redness on the side of the 
victim’s face, a bruise on the top and back of her head and the incriminating fact that defendant 
was found a couple of days later hiding from the police underneath a couch in his home with a 
knife, and another witness’ out-of-court testimony also admitted without confrontation, bolstered 
the primary witness’ account.  Id. at 140.  These facts might lead a court to wish to affirm the 
conviction but the facts do not determine the outcome of the Confrontation Clause analysis.  Id. 
264. See id. at 147 (citing Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2272-73); Manuel, 697 N.W.2d at 82. 
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daughter, and other members of the community.  Thus, those out-
of-court declarations were not testimonial.265 
This analysis conveniently neglects the Hammon decision and the 
Supreme Court’s discussion surrounding Hammon.  Davis encourages 
lower courts to read Hammon’s outcome as an anomaly for on the scene 
domestic violence calls, opining that “officers called to investigate . . . need 
to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation.”266  In 
Hammon, like Rodriguez, the officers also did not go to the home looking 
for evidence with which to prosecute a particular defendant, but were also 
answering a domestic violence call and objectively understood, they would 
need to assure the safety of members of the community and talk to the al-
leged victim to determine how next to proceed.  Also in Hammon, there was 
no structured police questioning but only the question “what happened.” 
The only real difference between Hammon and the Wisconsin case is 
the different conclusions the two courts reached on similar facts.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the police in Hammon were establishing past 
facts while Rodriguez concluded that the police were not.  With just a 
different conclusion on similar facts, the Wisconsin court expands the Davis 
case holding to the point that it contradicts the holding in Hammon.  Owing 
to the Supreme Court’s ambiguity, the newly announced rejuvenation of 
confrontation jurisprudence will not cause the demise of trial by out-of-
court accusation. 
Davis was the Court’s opportunity to correct lower courts in the 
domestic violence area that had flouted Crawford’s mandate for a meaning-
ful opportunity for juries to determine the reliability of the witnesses against 
the accused, namely face-to-face confrontation with cross-examination.  
Instead of correcting the ambiguities of Crawford that had tacitly permitted 
such a limited reading of Crawford, the Davis Court instead provided 
additional ambiguities, inviting lower courts to continue sanctioning trials 
by out-of-court accusation.  With Davis, the Court replaced its broad pro-
nouncements of two years before with narrow theories of confrontation 
 
265. Id. at 147. 
266.  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006). 
Although we necessarily reject the Indiana Supreme Court’s implication that virtually 
any “initial inquiries” at the crime scene will not be testimonial . . . we do not hold the 
opposite—that no questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers.  We have 
already observed of domestic disputes that “[o]fficers called to investigate . . . need to 
know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their 
own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.”   . . . Such exigencies may 
often mean that “initial inquiries” produce nontestimonial statements. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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rights derived from the lower court decisions that had failed to implement 
Crawford’s broad policy pronouncements.267 
VIII. STRAINING AT THE LEASH: A JURISPRUDENCE 
PERSPECTIVE 
Most researchers adopt a principal-agent approach to lower court 
decision-making, in which lower courts are expected to implement the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court.268  The principle-agent theory is a normative 
theory of how lower courts are supposed to function, where judges do not 
vote based on their own values or political persuasion.269  Social scientists 
and other theorists interested in finding out what actually happens in 
practice have established that in reality, lower courts are influenced to some 
degree by judges’ own ideological preferences when they apply Supreme 
Court doctrines.270  As Barry Friedman succinctly noted: “Outside the legal 
 
267. See People v. Brenn, 152 Cal. App. 4th 166, 178, (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that 
Davis was viewed as a capitulation to lower court’s narrow construction of Crawford by relying 
on a pre-Davis case for defining the term testimonial); see also People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 
4th 461, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (illustrating a pre-Davis case that read Crawford to exclude 
almost all domestic cases, opining “it is difficult to identify any circumstances under which a . . . 
spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial’”).  Brenn wrote: “Preliminary questions asked at the 
scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred do not rise to the level of an ‘interrogation.’  Such 
unstructured interaction between officer and witness bears no resemblance to a formal or informal 
police inquiry that is required for a police ‘interrogation’ as that term is used in Crawford.”  
Brenn, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 178 (quoting Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 469).  In other words, 
never mind that Davis held that the unstructured interaction in Hammon was testimonial; 
California continues to construe the clause otherwise. 
268. Kim, supra note 15, at 386-87 n.13.  The principal-agent approach is summed up in an 
article by George & Yoon as follows: 
Since the Supreme Court is formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s 
decisions can be conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its 
agents, the lower courts.  The Supreme Court has limited resources to monitor the 
actions of lower federal courts and state courts; therefore, the possibility arises that 
judges will not comply with Supreme Court preferences.  The Court obviously wishes 
to check these inconsistent rulings, but monitoring and enforcement is costly. 
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 819 (2003).  See also Mathew D. McCubbins, et al., Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243-44 (1987); Barry 
M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: The Policing “Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB. 
CHOICE 27, 40 (1975); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
739, 770 (1984); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent 
Perspective, 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 154-58 (1984). 
269. See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 10, at 258 (“Constitutional theory is all about 
cabining law from politics, both to ensure that judges are constrained by law (and thus do not 
simply vote their own values) and to prevent politics from influencing law.”). 
270. Id.; Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95.  See also Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1515 (2003) (concluding that appellate 
judges follow both the legal model and the political or ideological model of decisionmaking).  
Cross summarizes the empirical literature including a researcher named Daniel A. Pinello.  Id. at 
1481.  Pinello analyzed 79,000 decisions and concluded that the political model of decision-
making explain just under one quarter of circuit court decisions. Id. at 1481.  Cross then does his 
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academy, the interest in how judges behave is more ‘positive.’  That is to 
say, the focus in other disciplines is not so much on how judges should 
behave, as on how they do and why.”271  By reviewing data from a closed 
network of judicial decisions, social scientists concluded that judicial 
attitudes have demonstrably affected appellate decisionmaking of federal 
circuit courts in a significant subset of cases.272 
Social scientists have several theories about when lower courts resist 
applying Supreme Court doctrines, and they all resonate in the Confron-
tation Clause arena.  One theory is that judges are more likely to follow 
their own attitudes in “controversial civil libert[ies] cases.”273  A second 
theory is that judges are less likely to follow the high court decision when 
the judges have their own policy preference and have already made 
decisions based on this policy.274  The third theory looks at the Supreme 
Court decision that provides the precedent, finding that judges are less 
likely to follow the high court when the Supreme Court is ambiguous and 
the case law is overly complex.275 
All of these situations were at play following Crawford v. Washington.  
The right to confront one’s accuser is a civil liberty that remains 
controversial.  There are many countervailing policy arguments to be made 
against the right to confront one’s accusers.  One realistic concern is that 
domestic violence cases will be dismissed if the Confrontation Clause re-
quires the complainant to testify at trial.276  Many domestic violence victims 
choose not to prosecute, and where there is a history of abuse, there is 
always a possibility that the person was threatened into not proceeding with 
the case.277  That means that some people who commit crimes will get away 
 
own research and concludes that ideology influences the outcome thirty-three percent or more in 
certain situations. Id. at 1506.  He also concluded that the political model of decisionmaking is 
most likely underestimated in empirical measurements.  Id. at 1514.  For a prime example of 
scholarship by non-lawyers see Songer et al., supra note 11, at 688-89.  Songer concluded that in 
the search and seizure area, circuit court panel decisions were influenced both by precedent and 
the ideology of the judges on the appeals court panels.  Id. 
271. Friedman, supra note 10, at 258. 
272. Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95. 
273. Songer et al., supra note 11, at 676. 
274. See id. (providing that “the lower judges’ own policy preferences and whether their 
prior actions have created a commitment to an alternative interpretation will affect the nature of 
their response”). 
275. See id.  (“Johnson and Canon (1984) suggests that lower courts will be most responsive 
when the Supreme Court’s policy is clear, unambiguous, not overly complex, and readily 
available.”). 
276. Lininger, supra note 5, at 709-10 n.76 (estimating that eighty to ninety percent of 
domestic violence victims recant or do not come to court). 
277. The doctrine of forfeiture is supposed to protect the government in instances where the 
absence of the witness is caused by improper conduct on the part of the defendant.  See Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006) (“One who obtains the absence of a witness by 
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with them if witnesses do not show up for trial.  Even if the person charged 
is factually innocent, there is a deterrence value in not dismissing charges.  
Another problem for lower courts is judicial economy.  A system of justice 
based upon live witnesses who testify under oath subject to cross-
examination takes time and court resources.  It is much more efficient to 
truncate trials.  Of course dismissing cases will also improve judicial 
economy, but given public attitudes towards domestic types of crime, it is 
more likely that a stronger confrontation right will often mean continuances 
of trial dates and a dispatch of police investigators to the home of missing 
witnesses, thereby consuming more judicial resources.  Additionally, appel-
late judges generally prefer affirming criminal convictions and disfavor 
excluding evidence necessary for conviction.278  Implementing the Confron-
tation Clause, therefore, certainly constitutes a controversial civil liberty.  
Even if certain reasons are not explicitly stated in an opinion, they neverthe-
less can help shape the contours of the post-Crawford Confrontation 
Clause.279 
The second theory above, that judges who have already made decisions 
based on their own policy preferences are less likely to follow high court 
decisions, also plays out in domestic abuse cases.  Common sense would 
 
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”).  This doctrine is beyond the scope 
of this article.  However, the doctrine is not designed to bar the application of the Confrontation 
Clause in instances where witnesses freely choose not to cooperate.  Thus, in Crawford, the Court 
did not apply the forfeiture doctrine where the witness asserted the husband-wife privilege.  See 
generally Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 71 MO. 
L. REV. 285, 307-13 (2006).  In Davis, the Court writes: “We take no position on the standards 
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.”  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
278. See Songer et al., supra note 11 at 678. 
279. Davis addresses this issue directly thus: 
Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature 
of the offenses charged in these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater 
flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence.  This particular type of crime is 
notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she 
does not testify at trial.  When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal 
a windfall.  We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the 
effect of allowing the guilty to go free. 
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. at 2280. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, Indiana and Washington Coalitions Against Domestic Violence, Legal 
Momentum, et al. in Support of Respondents, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (Nos 
05-522A, 05-5705), 2006 WL 284229 (arguing that the forfeiture doctrine does not adequately 
solve the problem of prosecuting domestic violence cases and seeking a narrow definition of 
testimonial so that prosecutions can proceed in the domestic violence arena).  See generally 
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit 
Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 10-22 (2002); Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases: About a Third of 
Jurisdictions Prosecute Even Without Victim’s Testimony, 81 A.B.A. J. 14, 14 (1995) (providing 
an earlier article proposing the expansion of hearsay exceptions in domestic violence cases). 
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predict that the Confrontation Clause would be an area where judges would 
have strong preferences or attitudes, particularly as these rights apply to 
domestic abuse trials.  Some judges are likely to have a strong due process 
perspective, but the policy arguments in favor of confrontation rights may 
seem too abstract to many judges, particularly if they assume that those 
convicted without the opportunity to confront their accusers are factually 
guilty.  Before Crawford, many appellate courts had been affirming the use 
of excited utterances in place of live testimony, possibly reflecting the 
policy preferences of the judges on those courts. Finally, as the third theory 
would predict, the Crawford opinion is notoriously ambiguous and com-
plex.  Hence, social scientists would predict that lower courts would resist 
implementation of broad rights for confrontation in domestic violence 
cases.  
One important article by positivist theorists looked at how the Supreme 
Court would respond when lower courts resist implementing Supreme 
Court decisions.  The researchers assumed that lower court judges are likely 
to resist implementation of Supreme Court rulings with which they 
disagree.280  Even if judges accept the norms of deference and precedent as 
one of their motivations in reaching a decision, “we assume that judges do 
not check their political ideologies at the courthouse door” they wrote.281  
The article was written by two political scientists and a professor of public 
policy who combined their names into the name “McNollgast.”282  
McNollgast theorized that the Supreme Court induces lower courts to 
adhere to its choice of doctrine by broadening or narrowing the scope of its 
rulings.283  Where most lower courts generally agree with the Court’s 
doctrine in an area of law, the Court can create a narrow doctrine that gives 
lower courts less flexibility in implementing the decision.284 
In contrast, when most lower courts differ substantially from the 
preferred doctrine of the Supreme Court, the problem of noncom-
pliance becomes important.  Our theory suggests that the Supreme 
 
280. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the 
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1641-47 (1995). 
281. Id. at 1636-37. 
282. McNollgast is a combination of three people: Matthew McCubbins, Professor of 
Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Roger Noll, Morris M. Doyle Professor of 
Public Policy, Stanford University; Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; and Barry Weingast, 
Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 
n.a1. Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers And Positive Political Theory: The Tug Of War Over 
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 672 (1992). 
283. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 1634. 
284. Id.; see also McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 105, 110 (2006). 
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Court will expand the range of lower court decisions that it finds 
acceptable when faced with substantial noncompliance by the 
lower courts.  By expanding the latitude allowed under its prece-
dents, the Court both cajoles some lower bench jurists to abide by 
the new precedents and isolates those who do not.  The Court can 
then focus its attention on the most egregiously nonconforming 
lower court decisions, and on the issues it most cares about.285 
By broadening the scope of a doctrine, the Supreme Court induces 
lower courts to obey, because there will be fewer noncompliant courts and 
these become isolated and are possible targets for review and reversal.  
McNollgast coins the term “doctrinal interval” to mean “the range of partic-
ular, perhaps inconsistent rules that are acceptable to the Supreme Court 
when reviewing decisions by a lower court.”286  Under the McNollgast 
theory, lower courts subtly shape Supreme Court doctrine, not by changing 
the choice of doctrine, but by convincing the Supreme Court to create 
greater leeway within the new doctrine.  Lower court resistance, therefore, 
creates larger doctrinal intervals. 
This theory fits the recent interplay between the lower courts and the 
Supreme Court in Confrontation Clause doctrine.  First, there is what 
McNollgast called a shock, a new ruling in some cases inspired by new 
legal theories.287  Indeed, the Crawford shock to Confrontation Clause 
doctrine was occasioned by the writings of several scholars.288  Second, 
once the Supreme Court chooses to accept a case and announces a new 
legal doctrine, “each lower court in future cases decides whether to comply 
with the new doctrine.”289  This article has examined the cases after 
Crawford.  Third, the Supreme Court decides which appeals to hear as a 
means of forcing compliance on lower courts and decides whether to alter 
its doctrine.  In the Confrontation Clause arena, the Supreme Court accept-
ed certiorari in two domestic violence cases and Davis altered the legal 
doctrine.  The McNollgast theory also looked at another step in the process 
beyond the scope of this article, namely decisions of the legislature and 
federal branch of government whether to intervene.  This article focuses on 
the influence the lower courts exert on the Supreme Court by resisting a 
 
285. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 1634. 
286. Id. at 1639. 
287. Id. at 1640. 
288. In Crawford, the Court writes “Members of this Court and academics have suggested 
that we revise our doctrine to reflect more accurately the original understanding of the Clause.” 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (citing A. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31 (1997)). 
289. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 1640. 
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new doctrine and testing the validity of the McNollgast theory in the 
context of confrontation rights and challenging the new normative theory of 
Pauline Kim, who encourages lower court judges to follow their own policy 
leanings.290 
While the McNollgast article has been well respected,291 empiricists 
have found that most courts do not resist Supreme Court precedents.292  
Social scientists have demonstrated that by-in large, lower federal courts 
conform to the principal-agent model and faithfully implement Supreme 
Court precedent.293  The number of cases where researchers found incon-
gruence between the Supreme Court and lower courts is but a fraction of the 
number of cases where judges conform to Supreme Court precedent.294  
However, the lower court decisions analyzed in this article suggest that 
these empiricists may be mistaken about the level of noncompliance. 
To social scientists gathering data, the Confrontation Clause area of 
law may look very different from the way it appears to lawyers and legal 
scholars.  It would be unlikely for a social scientist to decide that lower 
courts were not following the Supreme Court’s Crawford decision when the 
Supreme Court then turned around and adopted the reasoning of the lower 
courts.  Those trained in the law must determine whether, as I suggest, the 
lower courts in Davis failed to implement the policy doctrine announced in 
Crawford, or whether lower courts did precisely what they were expected to 
do, namely, they took a new fact pattern (the 911 caller or informal police 
questioning at the scene) and applied the precedent (Crawford) as best as 
they could.295  For example, social scientists would code the Washington 
court decision in Davis as compliant with precedent because the conviction 
was affirmed on appeal, but this would be misleading because in fact, the 
doctrine changed on appeal.  If I am right that this was a case of the lower 
 
290. Kim, supra note 15, at 408-26. 
291. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2027, 2101 n.207 (2002); David. S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the 
Senate, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 497 n.97 (2005); Ernest A. 
Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1208 n.272 
(2005). 
292. Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: 
The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decision-Making, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
293. Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95. 
294. Chad Westerland et al., Lower Court Defiance of (Compliance With) The U.S. Supreme 
Court, 4, 16 (2006), http://www.princeton.edu/~ccameron/Defiance.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 
2007). See also Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance 
and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. 
Q., 297, 297-316 (1990). 
295. See Kim, supra note 15, at 442 (questioning the normative assumption that “lower 
courts should also conform to the policy preferences of the Supreme Court, even when not 
expressed in binding decisional law”). 
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court causing the Supreme Court to alter its doctrine, this would be invisible 
to empirical researchers.  Thus, the extent of lower court resistance may be 
precisely as the McNollgast team assumed. 
One key question not addressed by the McNollgast team is, assuming 
that lower courts were resisting the large policy shift, was this behavior le-
gitimate?  The answer turns in part on how one defines the role of the lower 
courts.  Traditional legal theory forbids a court from taking into account its 
own preferences.296  Professor Kim argued that our system should expect 
lower courts to follow their own policy attitudes when the Court gives them 
latitude to do so.297  Kim’s normative view did not embrace full-scale resis-
tance by the lower courts.  Instead, Kim theorized that lower courts must 
conform their rulings to Supreme Court precedent.298  It is only where the 
Court allows discretion that lower court judges may assert their own policy 
preferences in deciding cases rather than adopting the policy enunciated by 
the Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, Kim’s theory breaks with the traditional 
constitutional theory where judges are expected to implement the policy of 
the Supreme Court and not act on their own politics and values.299  Kim’s 
theory also reflects a different understanding of how resistance works in 
practice from the theory announced by the McNollgast team.  Kim assumed 
that the lower courts shirk precedent without violating the legal rules of 
precedent.  In contrast, the McNollgast team theory assumed that judges 
will follow their own policy prerogatives, and that the ideals instilled during 
law school of following precedent and the rule of law only form some of 
the attitudinal preferences of judges. 
One problem with Kim’s theory is that she too facilely distinguished 
between courts that fail to follow precedent from those that follow prece-
dent but do not follow Supreme Court policy.  This distinction is easier to 
make theoretically than to apply in an actual set of cases such as the Con-
frontation Clause decisions.  Applying her theory to Confrontation Clause 
doctrine, empiricists may conclude the lower courts were behaving 
correctly when they refused to apply Crawford’s broad mandate.  After all, 
Crawford was vague about the contours of its new jurisprudence, inviting 
lower appellate courts to implement the new rules according to their own 
policy perspectives.  Lower courts had a great deal of discretion, empiricists 
 
296. Cross, supra note 270, at 1463.  See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 
1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 64-65 
(1992) (“Courts are to stick to law, judgment, and reason in making their decisions and should 
leave politics, will, and value choice to others.”). 
297. Kim, supra note 15, at 442. 
298. Id. 
299. Sullivan, supra note 296, at 64-65. 
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might conclude, because Crawford only decided the case before it and left 
to another day a comprehensive view of the new jurisprudence.  Indeed, all 
the language in Crawford about the deeply embedded right to face one’s 
accusers represents mere policy.  Lower courts instituted their own policy 
preferences in favor of less confrontation rights and less change from recent 
trial practices.  Therefore, one may conclude the lower courts were follow-
ing Kim’s model, legitimately resisting the Court’s views—“shirking” as 
the social scientists label it—but all legitimately, without violating any 
textbook model of judicial behavior.300 
On the other hand, other empiricists could draw the opposite 
conclusion and find that lower courts were not following precedent after 
Crawford.  Lower courts implementing a formality rationale cannot have 
been correct when they decided that colloquial interrogation meant station-
house interviews nor could Crawford have meant that the Framers would 
have wanted to encourage less formality in obtaining statements for trial.  
Lower courts implementing a state-of-mind rationale also could not have 
been correct given that Crawford itself likely would have come out 
differently if the Supreme Court had utilized the this lower court approach 
to Mrs. Crawford’s state-of-mind.301  Nor could lower courts implementing 
the intent-of-the-officers rationale have been correct when the Crawford 
opinion itself did not propose the intent of the questioner as a possible core 
definition and the Court could not have intended to base confrontation 
rights on whether conversations with police occurred on doorsteps or at the 
kitchen table.  Hence, empiricists may conclude, as this article does, that 
most lower courts were not following Crawford’s precedent when they 
applied the case to domestic violence prosecutions. 
I coin the term “straining at the leash” in order to avoid having to 
determine whether the lower courts were following precedent or not.  Post-
Crawford cases demonstrate that empiricists would have difficulty deter-
mining whether lower courts legitimately resisted Supreme Court policy 
arguments or whether their resistance violated precedent.  Kim’s assump-
tion that lower courts follow precedent even when they shirk the policy is 
 
300. Justice Scalia wrote the following in a law review article reviewing a book on legal 
philosophy: 
[T]he fact that the “holding” of a judicial opinion—the portion of its text or the aspect 
of its disposition that binds later courts—is almost infinitely expandable or contract-
able, ranging from the mere prescription that these particular facts produce this partic-
ular result to the broad “rationale” expressed by the court to justify that prescription. 
Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 687, 688 
(2006). 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37 (discussing what Ms. Crawford was 
thinking). 
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difficult to verify and is probably inaccurate given this article’s dissection 
of the case law arising between Crawford and Davis. 
In trying to classify lower court domestic abuse Confrontation Clause 
decisions after Crawford as legitimate or illegitimate under Kim’s theory, 
we find it almost impossible to sort out Crawford’s policy from its value as 
precedent.  Crawford is a particularly apt example of a case that cries out 
for lower courts to implement the policy behind the decision.  By its very 
ambiguity and lofty language it begged lower courts to employ the new 
policy considerations to help the Court determine the full scope of the opin-
ion.  To reduce Crawford’s precedential value to a reversal of a conviction 
because a statement was wrongly introduced under the declaration against 
interest exception is to miss Crawford’s decision altogether.  In this situa-
tion, for lower courts to introduce their own policy is the same thing as not 
following precedent, resisting implementation, as McNollgast calls it, or not 
conforming, as other theorists describe it.  Even if one concludes that the 
decisions followed precedent, it seems fair to call what the lower courts did 
shirking.  This calls into question Kim’s normative suggestion that law ben-
efits when lower courts employ their own values rather than following the 
Supreme Court. 
Most disturbing about giving the green light to value-driven decisions 
by lower courts is that Kim suggests it as an approach to all areas of law, 
including Supreme Court decisions on the protections in the Bill of Rights.  
Even if Kim is generally correct that lower courts may improve upon case 
law development if they employ their own policy preferences, when it 
comes to criminal justice issues this is not true.  Rights for the accused are 
politically unpopular and this is precisely the reason for constitutional 
amendments designed to protect these rights.  Whenever there is a decision 
that favors the rights of the accused, there is likely to be resistance from the 
lower courts and perhaps from the public and political branches as well.  
But this resistance is not to be celebrated.  The resistance of the lower 
courts should not be viewed as acceptable when it concerns implementation 
of constitutional rights for those without much power in the legislative 
system. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
State court decisions interpreted Crawford v. Washington too narrowly, 
especially in domestic violence cases.  These decisions exploited Craw-
ford’s ambiguities to limit the reach of Crawford so that trial courts could 
continue to allow the government to repeat prior accusations at trial in place 
of live testimony.  State and lower courts used three different rationales to 
exclude statements made to 911 operators or to police at the scene from the 
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scope of the Sixth Amendment.  In the wake of Crawford, some courts 
looked at the formality of the statements at issue to determine if they were 
within the scope of the Confrontation Clause while other courts considered 
the state-of-mind of the person making the statement to narrow the reach of 
statements made to 911 operators or to police at the scene.  A few courts 
looked at the intent of the officers in gathering the statements.  The 
rationales were wrong for different reasons, but all deny Crawford’s vision 
of a return to the principle that “no man shall be prejudiced by evidence 
which he had not the liberty to cross-examine.” 302 
In a period of two years, we observed the Supreme Court announce an 
ambitious albeit ambiguous plan to restore confrontation rights to criminal 
defendants followed by a second Court decision, Davis, which retreated 
from its earlier pronouncements and actually adopted much of the analysis 
of the lower courts.  This suggests that at least part of the explanation for 
this retreat from Crawford’s bold pronouncement of a return to trial by 
witness is that the Court was responsive to the lower court resistance.  
Other law reviews may look to the internal dynamic between the Supreme 
Court justices to determine outcome, but this inquiry may not explain how 
the theories developed to rationalize a shrunken confrontation right that 
took root in Davis but not in Crawford.  This article traces how these ration-
ales appeared in the lower courts before they were adopted at least in part, 
by the Supreme Court.  It appears that the dog strained on the leash and the 
owner changed direction almost back to where it was before.303 
Pauline Kim’s recent normative theory embraces the idea that lower 
courts should employ their own policy prerogatives when implementing 
Supreme Court precedent.  The domestic violence cases examined in this 
article challenge Kim’s theory.  The decisions challenge the notion that 
lower courts can faithfully implement a Supreme Court decision when they 
are guided by policy considerations drastically different than those articu-
lated by the Court.  The decision challenges the notion that when a Supreme 
Court decision is strong on policy but weak on specifics, whether there is 
any way to follow precedent without following the newly articulated 
Supreme Court policy.  In addition, the domestic violence cases challenge 
the notion that it is normatively preferable for lower courts to ignore 
Supreme Court policy preferences when the cases involve the constitutional 
 
302. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103 
(Super. L. & Eq. 1794)). 
303. This straining at the leash is different in kind from the normal principal-agent perspec-
tive where lower courts “can influence the Court’s agenda by anticipating or moving ahead of the 
Court on certain issues, taking the lead on new legal questions or new approaches.”  George & 
Yoon, supra note 268, at 825. 
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rights of those accused of crimes.  Because criminal defendants have so 
little power in the legislative system they rely on the courts to implement 
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections.  If lower courts make 
decisions that promote efficiency at the expense of the right to face one’s 
accusers, the only likely redress is the Supreme Court.  When the Supreme 
Court tells the lower courts that under the Sixth Amendment the policy 
should favor the right to confront one’s accusers, the decision means little if 
lower courts do not follow the policy.  There are so few cases that actually 
end up before the Supreme Court that the Court’s only real power in the 
system is the institutional systems of precedent and rule of law.  When 
lower courts did not adopt Crawford’s policy preference in favor of trial by 
live witness and instead focused on factual distinctions between the 
Crawford case and the cases before them in order to affirm convictions 
based on allegations repeated at witnessless trials, Crawford became tooth-
less.  There are too few cases to reach the Supreme Court for the Court to 
be able to withstand such widespread resistance.  Clothed in wonderful 
phrases that harkened back to the days when witnesses had to come to 
court, take the oath, and testify live before a jury, Crawford actually 
became a decision that narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause.304  
What we learn from examining this subset of cases is that when the 
Supreme Court broadens constitutional rights, lower courts should strive to 
implement the policy behind the new decision. 
 
304. Although Crawford prevented an ever expanding array of reliable hearsay from being 
introduced without live witnesses, Crawford also narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause 
by allowing unreliable statements to be introduced at trial without the usual tools to determine 
reliability, namely confrontation. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  See also W. Jeremy Counseller & 
Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth, 
Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3, 19 (2005); Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 
2268 (2006) (“A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must 
fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”). 
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